control: tags -1 patch
On 2016-06-26 12:22:31 [+0200], Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> There is a libssl-dev package available in experimental that contains a recent
> snapshot, I suggest you try building against that to see if everything works.
compiles, test suite passes. There is still RSA_generate_key().
> Kurt
Sebastian
>From 285baad51e3ce9609958a892d6b5246ed9dda9ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebast...@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 19:52:44 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] libcrypt-openssl-rsa-perl: get it compiled with openssl 1.1.0
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebast...@breakpoint.cc>
---
RSA.xs | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 142 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/RSA.xs b/RSA.xs
index de512e7822d0..767ec0f8fc31 100644
--- a/RSA.xs
+++ b/RSA.xs
@@ -47,9 +47,119 @@ void croakSsl(char* p_file, int p_line)
#define THROW(p_result) if (!(p_result)) { error = 1; goto err; }
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
+
+static void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+ const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+ if (n != NULL)
+ *n = r->n;
+ if (e != NULL)
+ *e = r->e;
+ if (d != NULL)
+ *d = r->d;
+}
+
+static int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+ /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
+ * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+ */
+ if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+ || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (n != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->n);
+ r->n = n;
+ }
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->e);
+ r->e = e;
+ }
+ if (d != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->d);
+ r->d = d;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+ /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->p);
+ r->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->q);
+ r->q = q;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = r->p;
+ if (q != NULL)
+ *q = r->q;
+}
+
+static int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+ /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+ || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+ || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->dmp1);
+ r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+ }
+ if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->dmq1);
+ r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+ }
+ if (iqmp != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->iqmp);
+ r->iqmp = iqmp;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+ const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+ const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+ if (dmp1 != NULL)
+ *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+ if (dmq1 != NULL)
+ *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+ if (iqmp != NULL)
+ *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+#endif
+
char _is_private(rsaData* p_rsa)
{
- return(p_rsa->rsa->d != NULL);
+ const BIGNUM *d;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(p_rsa->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+ return(d != NULL);
}
SV* make_rsa_obj(SV* p_proto, RSA* p_rsa)
@@ -136,7 +246,7 @@ unsigned char* get_message_digest(SV* text_SV, int hash_method)
}
}
-SV* bn2sv(BIGNUM* p_bn)
+SV* bn2sv(const BIGNUM* p_bn)
{
return p_bn != NULL
? sv_2mortal(newSViv((IV) BN_dup(p_bn)))
@@ -325,10 +435,11 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
croak("At least a modulous and public key must be provided");
}
CHECK_OPEN_SSL(rsa = RSA_new());
- rsa->n = n;
- rsa->e = e;
+ RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
if (p || q)
{
+ BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+
error = 0;
THROW(ctx = BN_CTX_new());
if (!p)
@@ -341,8 +452,7 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
q = BN_new();
THROW(BN_div(q, NULL, n, p, ctx));
}
- rsa->p = p;
- rsa->q = q;
+ RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q);
THROW(p_minus_1 = BN_new());
THROW(BN_sub(p_minus_1, p, BN_value_one()));
THROW(q_minus_1 = BN_new());
@@ -353,13 +463,17 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
THROW(BN_mul(d, p_minus_1, q_minus_1, ctx));
THROW(BN_mod_inverse(d, e, d, ctx));
}
- rsa->d = d;
- THROW(rsa->dmp1 = BN_new());
- THROW(BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, p_minus_1, ctx));
- THROW(rsa->dmq1 = BN_new());
- THROW(BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, q_minus_1, ctx));
- THROW(rsa->iqmp = BN_new());
- THROW(BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, q, p, ctx));
+ RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d);
+
+ THROW(dmp1 = BN_new());
+ THROW(dmq1 = BN_new());
+ THROW(iqmp = BN_new());
+
+ THROW(BN_mod(dmp1, d, p_minus_1, ctx));
+ THROW(BN_mod(dmq1, d, q_minus_1, ctx));
+ THROW(BN_mod_inverse(iqmp, q, p, ctx));
+
+ RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp);
THROW(RSA_check_key(rsa) == 1);
err:
if (p_minus_1) BN_clear_free(p_minus_1);
@@ -373,7 +487,7 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
}
else
{
- rsa->d = d;
+ RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d);
}
RETVAL = make_rsa_obj(proto, rsa);
}
@@ -386,15 +500,21 @@ _get_key_parameters(p_rsa)
PPCODE:
{
RSA* rsa;
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q;
+ const BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+
rsa = p_rsa->rsa;
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->n));
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->e));
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->d));
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->p));
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->q));
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->dmp1));
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->dmq1));
- XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->iqmp));
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+ RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(n));
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(e));
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(d));
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(p));
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(q));
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(dmp1));
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(dmq1));
+ XPUSHs(bn2sv(iqmp));
}
SV*
--
2.9.3
