On 13.10.2016 22:22, Paul Szabo wrote: > Package: tomcat8 > Version: 8.0.14-1+deb8u3 > Severity: critical > Tags: security > Justification: root security hole > > > [ I contacted t...@security.debian.org about this, but no response ... ]
I am CCing the security team in case they want to chime in here.
>
> Recently DSA-3670 was released, and /etc/init.d/tomcat8 modified so:
>
> ...
> NAME=tomcat8
> ...
> JVM_TMP=/tmp/tomcat8-$NAME-tmp
> ...
> # Remove / recreate JVM_TMP directory
> rm -rf "$JVM_TMP"
> mkdir -p "$JVM_TMP" || {
> log_failure_msg "could not create JVM temporary
> directory"
> exit 1
> }
> chown $TOMCAT8_USER "$JVM_TMP"
> ...
No, we did not modify this part in /etc/init.d/tomcat8. We fixed
CVE-2016-1240 by applying this patch
https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-java/tomcat8.git/commit/?h=jessie&id=9a9fd4f1cae13304beed6d4e445d1be8a3917fe0
> That suffers from a TOCTOU race condition.
>
> An attacker can, after the "rm -rf", create a symlink to /etc. Then
> "mkdir -p" returns success (though does nothing); and chown follows
> the symlink. That is "game over": ability to replace /etc/passwd.
>
> The attacker can use inotify and act quickly, and have a good chance
> of winning the race to create the symlink before the init.d script
> starts a new mkdir process.
>
> Do you need some working PoC code?
I don't understand how this affects our solution for CVE-2016-1240. If
you claim this is a new issue, then more information and a working proof
of concept code are appreciated. Please send them to the security team
first and not to a public mailing list.
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