Hi! Antoine Beaupré: > I know this is not Parcimonie's fault. It's gnupg's fault or, more > precisely, dirmngr's, but it seems difficult to change things over > there: this would require rewriting dirmngr's network routines
… at least so they're network-status aware and don't treat "my system is offline" as "the keyserver is down". > or reimplementing parcimonie within dirmngr itself. Sure, that would be ideal. Note that it *also* requires fixing dirmngr. > Instead, I've started thinking about what a parcimonie rewrite would > look like, one that would *not* depend on dirmngr (or, in fact, any > specific OpenPGP implementation). If you permit, I would like to use > this space to brainstorm such a design […] I'm glad you're bringing such out-of-the-box thinking in this space! It's refreshing. I did not put much thought into it yet but at first glance, your design makes sense to me. > All this doesn't seem that complicated to me. The tricky bit is the gate > to keep garbage and hostile keys from going into the keyring. Agreed, that was my concern as well. > I would welcome feedback on how this could be done, or if it's just an > incredibly stupid idea. I'll happily let you reuse the parcimonie name once you have it working with good enough™ backwards compatibility with the current interfaces. > Thanks, and sorry for hijacking this thread with such wild ideas. :) By all means, please keep going wild :) Cheers, -- intrigeri
