On Mon 2019-02-11 17:15:53 -0500, Scott Kitterman wrote:
> I can see advantages to this approach.  I took the path I did since I was 
> implementing an opendkim replacement and that's how it's done there.
>
> I think the milter would have to do something obnoxious like fail to start if 
> it had write access to the keys.  I have vague and not well formed concerns 
> that it being able to do that could be bad.

I agree it would be bad, but i'd be happy with an obnoxious warning
about unnecessarily-writable keys, and not a crash.

> I think a MAC system like SE Linux or Apparmor probably makes more sense as a 
> security measure on modern systems than using a chroot, so that's probably 
> not 
> a concern.

makes sense.

> It would probably cause some significant deployment friction in the short-
> term, since no distros would have it (unless it's something we can include in 
> the package, which means something in Python, not C).
>
> In the near-term, I think we need to have two ways to start: one with systemd 
> (socket activation) and one for all other init systems.  If you can give me 
> an 
> idea what the socket activation changes might look like, I can think about 
> how 
> I might integrate the two.

hm, i'm looking at python3-milter -- the main issue i see is that
libmilter seems to want to open the socket on its own, and i don't see a
way to ask libmilter to simply use a file descriptor that you already
have available :( So it's possible that this won't work without some
patches to sendmail (e.g. passing an "fd:3" string to setconn()), which
is a drag.

Is there some pythonic milter implementation that *doesn't* link against
libmilter?

        --dkg

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