Package: sudo
Severity: normal

I have backported the applicable CVE-2021-3156 patches from stretch (1.8.19p1-2.1+deb9u3) to jessie. The patches are enclosed any apply on 1.8.10p3-1+deb8u7.
From: "Todd C. Miller" <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 09:04:39 +0100
Subject: Don't assume that argv is allocated as a single flat buffer.

While this is how the kernel behaves it is not a portable assumption.
The assumption may also be violated if getopt_long(3) permutes arguments.
Found by Qualys.

[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport to 1.8.27 and 1.8.19p1: Context changes]
[Bastian Germann: Backport to 1.8.10p3]
---
--- a/src/parse_args.c
+++ b/src/parse_args.c
@@ -457,11 +457,13 @@
 	if (argc != 0) {
 	    /* shell -c "command" */
 	    char *src, *dst;
-	    size_t cmnd_size = (size_t) (argv[argc - 1] - argv[0]) +
-		strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 1;
+	    size_t size = 0;
 
-	    cmnd = dst = emalloc2(cmnd_size, 2);
-	    for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) {
+            for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++)
+                size += strlen(*av) + 1;
+            if (size == 0 || (cmnd = emalloc2(size, 2)) == NULL)
+	        fatalx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
+	    for (dst = cmnd, av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) {
 		for (src = *av; *src != '\0'; src++) {
 		    /* quote potential meta characters */
 		    if (!isalnum((unsigned char)*src) && *src != '_' && *src != '-' && *src != '$')
From: "Todd C. Miller" <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 09:03:43 +0100
Subject: Fix potential buffer overflow when unescaping backslashes in user_args.

Do not try to unescaping backslashes unless in run mode *and* we are
running the command via a shell.
Found by Qualys.

[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport to 1.8.27: Context changes]
[Bastian Germann: Backport to 1.8.10p3]
---
--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.h
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.h
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@
 #define FOUND                   0
 #define NOT_FOUND               1
 #define NOT_FOUND_DOT		2
+#define NOT_FOUND_ERROR		3
 
 /*
  * Various modes sudo can be in (based on arguments) in hex
--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@
 
     /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
     /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
-    if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
+    if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
 	if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
 	    struct passwd *pw;
 
@@ -608,8 +608,8 @@
     if (user_cmnd == NULL)
 	user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
 
-    if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
-	if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
+    if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT|MODE_CHECK)) {
+	if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
 	    if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt())
 		path = def_secure_path;
 	    set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
@@ -634,7 +634,8 @@
 	    for (size = 0, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++)
 		size += strlen(*av) + 1;
 	    user_args = emalloc(size);
-	    if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+	    if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) &&
+		    ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
 		/*
 		 * When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end
 		 * escapes potential meta chars.  We unescape non-spaces
@@ -642,10 +643,22 @@
 		 */
 		for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) {
 		    while (*from) {
-			if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1]))
+			if (from[0] == '\\' && from[1] != '\0' &&
+				!isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) {
 			    from++;
+			}
+			if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) {
+			    warningx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"),
+				__func__);
+			    debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
+			}
 			*to++ = *from++;
 		    }
+		    if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) {
+			warningx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"),
+			    __func__);
+			debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
+		    }
 		    *to++ = ' ';
 		}
 		*--to = '\0';
From: "Todd C. Miller" <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 09:02:42 +0100
Subject: Reset valid_flags to MODE_NONINTERACTIVE for sudoedit.

This is consistent with how the -e option is handled.
Also reject -H and -P flags for sudoedit as was done in sudo 1.7.
Found by Qualys.

[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport to 1.8.27 and 1.8.19p1: Context changes]
[Bastian Germann: Backport to 1.8.10p3]
---
 src/parse_args.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/src/parse_args.c
+++ b/src/parse_args.c
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ static struct sudo_settings sudo_setting
 /*
  * Default flags allowed when running a command.
  */
-#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS	(MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_SHELL)
+#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS	(MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS|MODE_SHELL)
+#define EDIT_VALID_FLAGS	MODE_NONINTERACTIVE
+#define LIST_VALID_FLAGS	(MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST)
+#define VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS	MODE_NONINTERACTIVE
 
 /* Option number for the --host long option due to ambiguity of the -h flag. */
 #define OPT_HOSTNAME	256
@@ -189,6 +192,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
     if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
 	mode = MODE_EDIT;
 	sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true";
+	valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS;
     }
 
     /* Load local IP addresses and masks. */
@@ -257,7 +261,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
 			usage_excl(1);
 		    mode = MODE_EDIT;
 		    sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true";
-		    valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
+		    valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS;
 		    break;
 		case 'g':
 		    runas_group = optarg;
@@ -265,6 +269,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
 		    break;
 		case 'H':
 		    sudo_settings[ARG_SET_HOME].value = "true";
+		    SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME);
 		    break;
 		case 'h':
 		    if (optarg == NULL) {
@@ -312,7 +317,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
 			    usage_excl(1);
 		    }
 		    mode = MODE_LIST;
-		    valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST;
+		    valid_flags = LIST_VALID_FLAGS;
 		    break;
 		case 'n':
 		    SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE);
@@ -320,6 +325,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
 		    break;
 		case 'P':
 		    sudo_settings[ARG_PRESERVE_GROUPS].value = "true";
+		    SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
 		    break;
 		case 'p':
 		    sudo_settings[ARG_PROMPT].value = optarg;
@@ -350,7 +356,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
 		    if (mode && mode != MODE_VALIDATE)
 			usage_excl(1);
 		    mode = MODE_VALIDATE;
-		    valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
+		    valid_flags = VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS;
 		    break;
 		case 'V':
 		    if (mode && mode != MODE_VERSION)
@@ -388,7 +394,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
     if (!mode) {
 	/* Defer -k mode setting until we know whether it is a flag or not */
 	if (sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value != NULL) {
-	    if (argc == 0 && !(flags & (MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))) {
+	    if (argc == 0 && !ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
 		mode = MODE_INVALIDATE;	/* -k by itself */
 		sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value = NULL;
 		valid_flags = 0;
@@ -451,7 +457,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *n
     /*
      * For shell mode we need to rewrite argv
      */
-    if (ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN) && ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) {
+    if (ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN)) {
 	char **av, *cmnd = NULL;
 	int ac = 1;
 

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