Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian....@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock
X-Debbugs-Cc: em...@packages.debian.org, Sean Whitton 
<spwhit...@spwhitton.name>, j...@debian.org, car...@debian.org
Control: affects -1 + src:emacs

Hi release team members,

Please unblock package emacs

Sean might give some additional input if you need some additional
information. Between 1:28.2+1-10 and 1:28.2+1-13 of emacs, there were
security fixes for CVE-2022-48337, CVE-2022-48338, CVE-2022-48339,
CVE-2023-27985 and CVE-2023-27986.

CVE-2022-48337, CVE-2022-48338 and CVE-2022-48339 were covered as well
in DSA-5360-1 for bullseye.

Can you please unblock emacs/1:28.2+1-13 so we do not have regression
for those fixes from bullseye to bookworm?

(note the -13 entry has a off-by-one typo in one CVE identifier)

Regards,
Salvatore
diff -Nru emacs-28.2+1/debian/.git-dpm emacs-28.2+1/debian/.git-dpm
--- emacs-28.2+1/debian/.git-dpm        2023-01-18 01:32:40.000000000 +0100
+++ emacs-28.2+1/debian/.git-dpm        2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # see git-dpm(1) from git-dpm package
-595617abab6964ac0c6e617bae3d82692bf298b9
-595617abab6964ac0c6e617bae3d82692bf298b9
+4e6971c25c27c9a3f34cc69b51db894105362d08
+4e6971c25c27c9a3f34cc69b51db894105362d08
 279b82e64e15b5e2df3cb522636c6db85a8ee659
 279b82e64e15b5e2df3cb522636c6db85a8ee659
 emacs_28.2+1.orig.tar.xz
diff -Nru emacs-28.2+1/debian/changelog emacs-28.2+1/debian/changelog
--- emacs-28.2+1/debian/changelog       2023-01-18 01:32:40.000000000 +0100
+++ emacs-28.2+1/debian/changelog       2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
+emacs (1:28.2+1-13) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * Cherry-pick upstream fixes for command injection vulnerabilities
+    (CVE-2023-27984, CVE-2023-27986) (Closes: #1032538).
+
+ -- Sean Whitton <spwhit...@spwhitton.name>  Tue, 14 Mar 2023 13:30:28 -0700
+
+emacs (1:28.2+1-12) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * Fix memory leak in etags.c introduced by recent security fix.
+    Thanks to Adrian Bunk for identifying the issue.
+
+ -- Sean Whitton <spwhit...@spwhitton.name>  Thu, 02 Mar 2023 12:21:19 -0700
+
+emacs (1:28.2+1-11) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * Cherry-pick upstream fixes for command injection vulnerabilities
+    (CVE-2022-48337, CVE-2022-48338, CVE-2022-48339) (Closes: #1031730).
+
+ -- Sean Whitton <spwhit...@spwhitton.name>  Wed, 22 Feb 2023 11:01:50 -0700
+
 emacs (1:28.2+1-10) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   * Fix copyright tests for 2023 onwards.  Thanks to Mattias EngdegÄrd for
diff -Nru 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0020-Fix-htmlfontify.el-command-injection-vulnerability-C.patch
 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0020-Fix-htmlfontify.el-command-injection-vulnerability-C.patch
--- 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0020-Fix-htmlfontify.el-command-injection-vulnerability-C.patch
 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0020-Fix-htmlfontify.el-command-injection-vulnerability-C.patch
 2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 665489d7de786a61fa0c0883b9dffbc76487e37e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xi Lu <l...@shellcodes.org>
+Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2022 16:28:54 +0800
+Subject: Fix htmlfontify.el command injection vulnerability (CVE-2022-48339)
+
+This upstream patch has been incorporated to fix the problem:
+
+  Fix htmlfontify.el command injection vulnerability.
+
+  * lisp/htmlfontify.el (hfy-text-p): Fix command injection
+  vulnerability.  (Bug#60295)
+
+Origin: upstream, commit 807d2d5b3a7cd1d0e3f7dd24de22770f54f5ae16
+Bug: https://debbugs.gnu.org/60295
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1031730
+Forwarded: not-needed
+---
+ lisp/htmlfontify.el | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/htmlfontify.el b/lisp/htmlfontify.el
+index 115f67c9560..f8d1e205369 100644
+--- a/lisp/htmlfontify.el
++++ b/lisp/htmlfontify.el
+@@ -1882,7 +1882,7 @@ hfy-make-directory
+ 
+ (defun hfy-text-p (srcdir file)
+   "Is SRCDIR/FILE text?  Use `hfy-istext-command' to determine this."
+-  (let* ((cmd (format hfy-istext-command (expand-file-name file srcdir)))
++  (let* ((cmd (format hfy-istext-command (shell-quote-argument 
(expand-file-name file srcdir))))
+          (rsp (shell-command-to-string    cmd)))
+     (string-match "text" rsp)))
+ 
diff -Nru 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0021-Fix-ruby-mode.el-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE.patch
 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0021-Fix-ruby-mode.el-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE.patch
--- 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0021-Fix-ruby-mode.el-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE.patch
 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0021-Fix-ruby-mode.el-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE.patch
 2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 52fb40cf6a3c50c996cff79b0d4f81fc39c7badf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xi Lu <l...@shellcodes.org>
+Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 12:52:48 +0800
+Subject: Fix ruby-mode.el command injection vulnerability (CVE-2022-48338)
+
+This upstream patch has been incorporated to fix the problem:
+
+  Fix ruby-mode.el local command injection vulnerability (bug#60268)
+
+  * lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
+  (ruby-find-library-file): Fix local command injection vulnerability.
+
+Origin: upstream, commit 22fb5ff5126dc8bb01edaa0252829d853afb284f
+Bug: https://debbugs.gnu.org/60268
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1031730
+Forwarded: not-needed
+---
+ lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el b/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
+index 72631a6557f..9b05b04a52c 100644
+--- a/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
++++ b/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
+@@ -1819,7 +1819,7 @@ ruby-find-library-file
+       (setq feature-name (read-string "Feature name: " init))))
+   (let ((out
+          (substring
+-          (shell-command-to-string (concat "gem which " feature-name))
++          (shell-command-to-string (concat "gem which " (shell-quote-argument 
feature-name)))
+           0 -1)))
+     (if (string-match-p "\\`ERROR" out)
+         (user-error "%s" out)
diff -Nru 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0022-Fix-etags-local-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE-.patch
 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0022-Fix-etags-local-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE-.patch
--- 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0022-Fix-etags-local-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE-.patch
 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0022-Fix-etags-local-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE-.patch
 2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From f8822cd42a828c42d9b76bcd32de7e595ffb73c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: lu4nx <l...@shellcodes.org>
+Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 15:42:40 +0800
+Subject: Fix etags local command injection vulnerability (CVE-2022-48337)
+
+This upstream patch has been incorporated to fix the problem:
+
+  Fix etags local command injection vulnerability
+
+  * lib-src/etags.c: (escape_shell_arg_string): New function.
+  (process_file_name): Use it to quote file names passed to the
+  shell.  (Bug#59817)
+
+Origin: upstream, commit e339926272a598bd9ee7e02989c1662b89e64cf0
+Bug: https://debbugs.gnu.org/59817
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1031730
+Forwarded: not-needed
+---
+ lib-src/etags.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib-src/etags.c b/lib-src/etags.c
+index c9c32691016..a6bd7f66e29 100644
+--- a/lib-src/etags.c
++++ b/lib-src/etags.c
+@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ #define xrnew(op, n, m) ((op) = xnrealloc (op, n, (m) * 
sizeof *(op)))
+ static void put_entries (node *);
+ static void clean_matched_file_tag (char const * const, char const * const);
+ 
++static char *escape_shell_arg_string (char *);
+ static void do_move_file (const char *, const char *);
+ static char *concat (const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ static char *skip_spaces (char *);
+@@ -1704,13 +1705,16 @@ process_file_name (char *file, language *lang)
+       else
+       {
+ #if MSDOS || defined (DOS_NT)
+-        char *cmd1 = concat (compr->command, " \"", real_name);
+-        char *cmd = concat (cmd1, "\" > ", tmp_name);
++          int buf_len = strlen (compr->command) + strlen (" \"\" > \"\"") + 
strlen (real_name) + strlen (tmp_name) + 1;
++          char *cmd = xmalloc (buf_len);
++          snprintf (cmd, buf_len, "%s \"%s\" > \"%s\"", compr->command, 
real_name, tmp_name);
+ #else
+-        char *cmd1 = concat (compr->command, " '", real_name);
+-        char *cmd = concat (cmd1, "' > ", tmp_name);
++          char *new_real_name = escape_shell_arg_string (real_name);
++          char *new_tmp_name = escape_shell_arg_string (tmp_name);
++          int buf_len = strlen (compr->command) + strlen ("  > ") + strlen 
(new_real_name) + strlen (new_tmp_name) + 1;
++          char *cmd = xmalloc (buf_len);
++          snprintf (cmd, buf_len, "%s %s > %s", compr->command, 
new_real_name, new_tmp_name);
+ #endif
+-        free (cmd1);
+         inf = (system (cmd) == -1
+                ? NULL
+                : fopen (tmp_name, "r" FOPEN_BINARY));
+@@ -7689,6 +7693,55 @@ etags_mktmp (void)
+   return templt;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Adds single quotes around a string, if found single quotes, escaped it.
++ * Return a newly-allocated string.
++ *
++ * For example:
++ * escape_shell_arg_string("test.txt") => 'test.txt'
++ * escape_shell_arg_string("'test.txt") => ''\''test.txt'
++ */
++static char *
++escape_shell_arg_string (char *str)
++{
++  char *p = str;
++  int need_space = 2;           /* ' at begin and end */
++
++  while (*p != '\0')
++    {
++      if (*p == '\'')
++        need_space += 4;        /* ' to '\'', length is 4 */
++      else
++        need_space++;
++
++      p++;
++    }
++
++  char *new_str = xnew (need_space + 1, char);
++  new_str[0] = '\'';
++  new_str[need_space-1] = '\'';
++
++  int i = 1;                    /* skip first byte */
++  p = str;
++  while (*p != '\0')
++    {
++      new_str[i] = *p;
++      if (*p == '\'')
++        {
++          new_str[i+1] = '\\';
++          new_str[i+2] = '\'';
++          new_str[i+3] = '\'';
++          i += 3;
++        }
++
++      i++;
++      p++;
++    }
++
++  new_str[need_space] = '\0';
++  return new_str;
++}
++
+ static void
+ do_move_file(const char *src_file, const char *dst_file)
+ {
diff -Nru emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0023-Fix-memory-leak-in-etags.c.patch 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0023-Fix-memory-leak-in-etags.c.patch
--- emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0023-Fix-memory-leak-in-etags.c.patch   
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0023-Fix-memory-leak-in-etags.c.patch   
2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 3f6e215ea8d05e2760981c8ab5bce41879e54703 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eli Zaretskii <e...@gnu.org>
+Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2023 20:03:20 +0200
+Subject: Fix memory leak in etags.c
+
+This upstream patch has been incorporated to fix the problem:
+
+  * lib-src/etags.c (process_file_name): Free malloc'ed vars (bug#61819).
+
+Origin: upstream, commit 0fde314f6f6e6664cddab1b2f0fe20629cd39d14
+Bug: https://debbugs.gnu.org/61819
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1031888
+Forwarded: not-needed
+---
+ lib-src/etags.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib-src/etags.c b/lib-src/etags.c
+index a6bd7f66e29..ea80ba6e49a 100644
+--- a/lib-src/etags.c
++++ b/lib-src/etags.c
+@@ -1714,6 +1714,8 @@ process_file_name (char *file, language *lang)
+           int buf_len = strlen (compr->command) + strlen ("  > ") + strlen 
(new_real_name) + strlen (new_tmp_name) + 1;
+           char *cmd = xmalloc (buf_len);
+           snprintf (cmd, buf_len, "%s %s > %s", compr->command, 
new_real_name, new_tmp_name);
++        free (new_real_name);
++        free (new_tmp_name);
+ #endif
+         inf = (system (cmd) == -1
+                ? NULL
diff -Nru 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0024-Fix-quoted-argument-in-emacsclient-mail.desktop-CVE-.patch
 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0024-Fix-quoted-argument-in-emacsclient-mail.desktop-CVE-.patch
--- 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0024-Fix-quoted-argument-in-emacsclient-mail.desktop-CVE-.patch
 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0024-Fix-quoted-argument-in-emacsclient-mail.desktop-CVE-.patch
 2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From a7bd44852551bd9a4c04d56bac64a6ca3d9af9a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Ulrich=20M=C3=BCller?= <u...@gentoo.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 16:51:20 +0100
+Subject: Fix quoted argument in emacsclient-mail.desktop (CVE-2023-27985)
+
+This upstream patch has been incorporated to fix the problem:
+
+  Fix quoted argument in emacsclient-mail.desktop Exec key
+
+  Apparently the emacsclient-mail.desktop file doesn't conform to the
+  Desktop Entry Specification at
+  
https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/desktop-entry-spec-latest.html#exec-variables
+  which says about the Exec key:
+
+  | Field codes must not be used inside a quoted argument, the result of
+  | field code expansion inside a quoted argument is undefined.
+
+  However, the %u field code is used inside a quoted argument of the
+  Exec key in both the [Desktop Entry] and [Desktop Action new-window]
+  sections.
+  * etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop (Exec): The Desktop Entry
+  Specification does not allow field codes like %u inside a quoted
+  argument. Work around it by passing %u as first parameter ($1)
+  to the shell wrapper.
+  * etc/emacsclient.desktop (Exec): Use `sh` rather than `placeholder`
+  as the command name of the shell wrapper.  (Bug#60204)
+
+Origin: upstream, commit d32091199ae5de590a83f1542a01d75fba000467
+Bug: https://debbugs.gnu.org/60204
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1032538
+Forwarded: not-needed
+---
+ etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop | 4 ++--
+ etc/emacsclient.desktop      | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
+index b575a41758a..91df122c594 100644
+--- a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
++++ b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ [Desktop Entry]
+ Categories=Network;Email;
+ Comment=GNU Emacs is an extensible, customizable text editor - and more
+-Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" 
--eval \\\\(message-mailto\\\\ \\\\\\"%u\\\\\\"\\\\)"
++Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" 
--eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
+ Icon=emacs
+ Name=Emacs (Mail, Client)
+ MimeType=x-scheme-handler/mailto;
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Actions=new-window;new-instance;
+ 
+ [Desktop Action new-window]
+ Name=New Window
+-Exec=emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame --eval "(message-mailto 
\\"%u\\")"
++Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame --eval 
\\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
+ 
+ [Desktop Action new-instance]
+ Name=New Instance
+diff --git a/etc/emacsclient.desktop b/etc/emacsclient.desktop
+index 1ecdecffafd..a9f840c7033 100644
+--- a/etc/emacsclient.desktop
++++ b/etc/emacsclient.desktop
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Name=Emacs (Client)
+ GenericName=Text Editor
+ Comment=Edit text
+ 
MimeType=text/english;text/plain;text/x-makefile;text/x-c++hdr;text/x-c++src;text/x-chdr;text/x-csrc;text/x-java;text/x-moc;text/x-pascal;text/x-tcl;text/x-tex;application/x-shellscript;text/x-c;text/x-c++;
+-Exec=sh -c "if [ -n \\"\\$*\\" ]; then exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= 
--display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" \\"\\$@\\"; else exec emacsclient 
--alternate-editor= --create-frame; fi" placeholder %F
++Exec=sh -c "if [ -n \\"\\$*\\" ]; then exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= 
--display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" \\"\\$@\\"; else exec emacsclient 
--alternate-editor= --create-frame; fi" sh %F
+ Icon=emacs
+ Type=Application
+ Terminal=false
diff -Nru 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0025-Fix-code-injection-vulnerability-CVE-2023-27986.patch
 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0025-Fix-code-injection-vulnerability-CVE-2023-27986.patch
--- 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0025-Fix-code-injection-vulnerability-CVE-2023-27986.patch
      1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ 
emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/0025-Fix-code-injection-vulnerability-CVE-2023-27986.patch
      2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 4e6971c25c27c9a3f34cc69b51db894105362d08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Ulrich=20M=C3=BCller?= <u...@gentoo.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 18:25:37 +0100
+Subject: Fix code injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-27986)
+
+This upstream patch has been incorporated to fix the problem:
+
+  Fix Elisp code injection vulnerability in emacsclient-mail.desktop
+
+  A crafted mailto URI could contain unescaped double-quote
+  characters, allowing injection of Elisp code.  Therefore, any
+  '\' and '"' characters are replaced by '\\' and '\"', using Bash
+  pattern substitution (which is not available in the POSIX shell).
+
+  We want to pass literal 'u=${1//\\/\\\\}; u=${u//\"/\\\"};' in the
+  bash -c command, but in the desktop entry '"', '$', and '\' must
+  be escaped as '\\"', '\\$', and '\\\\', respectively (backslashes
+  are expanded twice, see the Desktop Entry Specification).
+
+  Reported by Gabriel Corona <gabriel.cor...@free.fr>.
+
+  * etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop (Exec): Escape backslash and
+  double-quote characters.
+
+Origin: upstream, commit 3c1693d08b0a71d40a77e7b40c0ebc42dca2d2cc
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1032538
+Forwarded: not-needed
+---
+ etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
+index 91df122c594..49c6f99f317 100644
+--- a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
++++ b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
+@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
+ [Desktop Entry]
+ Categories=Network;Email;
+ Comment=GNU Emacs is an extensible, customizable text editor - and more
+-Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" 
--eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
++# We want to pass the following commands to the shell wrapper:
++# u=${1//\\/\\\\}; u=${u//\"/\\\"}; exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= 
--display="$DISPLAY" --eval "(message-mailto \"$u\")"
++# Special chars '"', '$', and '\' must be escaped as '\\"', '\\$', and '\\\\'.
++Exec=bash -c "u=\\${1//\\\\\\\\/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\}; 
u=\\${u//\\\\\\"/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"}; exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= 
--display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$u\\\\\\")\\"" 
bash %u
+ Icon=emacs
+ Name=Emacs (Mail, Client)
+ MimeType=x-scheme-handler/mailto;
+@@ -13,7 +16,7 @@ Actions=new-window;new-instance;
+ 
+ [Desktop Action new-window]
+ Name=New Window
+-Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame --eval 
\\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
++Exec=bash -c "u=\\${1//\\\\\\\\/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\}; 
u=\\${u//\\\\\\"/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"}; exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= 
--create-frame --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$u\\\\\\")\\"" bash %u
+ 
+ [Desktop Action new-instance]
+ Name=New Instance
diff -Nru emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/series emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/series
--- emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/series  2023-01-18 01:32:40.000000000 +0100
+++ emacs-28.2+1/debian/patches/series  2023-03-14 21:30:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -17,3 +17,9 @@
 0017-Add-inhibit-native-compilation.patch
 0018-Rename-to-inhibit-automatic-native-compilation.patch
 0019-Fix-copyright-tests-for-2023-onwards.patch
+0020-Fix-htmlfontify.el-command-injection-vulnerability-C.patch
+0021-Fix-ruby-mode.el-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE.patch
+0022-Fix-etags-local-command-injection-vulnerability-CVE-.patch
+0023-Fix-memory-leak-in-etags.c.patch
+0024-Fix-quoted-argument-in-emacsclient-mail.desktop-CVE-.patch
+0025-Fix-code-injection-vulnerability-CVE-2023-27986.patch

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