Package: ca-certificates Version: 20250419 Severity: wishlist Quoting a recent security update for 'ca-certificates':
> Mozilla certificate authority bundle was updated to version 2.60 > The following certificate authorities were added (+): > + "AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS" > + "ANF Secure Server Root CA" > + "Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068" > + "Certainly Root E1" > + "Certainly Root R1" > + "Certum EC-384 CA" > + "Certum Trusted Root CA" > + "D-TRUST BR Root CA 1 2020" > + "D-TRUST EV Root CA 1 2020" > + "DigiCert TLS ECC P384 Root G5" > + "DigiCert TLS RSA4096 Root G5" > + "E-Tugra Global Root CA ECC v3" > + "E-Tugra Global Root CA RSA v3" > + "GlobalSign Root R46" > + "GlobalSign Root E46" > + "GLOBALTRUST 2020" > + "HARICA TLS ECC Root CA 2021" > + "HARICA TLS RSA Root CA 2021" > + "HiPKI Root CA - G1" > + "ISRG Root X2" > + "Security Communication ECC RootCA1" > + "Security Communication RootCA3" > + "Telia Root CA v2" > + "TunTrust Root CA" > + "vTrus ECC Root CA" > + "vTrus Root CA" Not thinking of any of those CAs specifically, but generally, I wonder if Debian's users are served by having all of the WebPKI CAs enabled by default. Including any public CA certificate is definitely useful, for users to be able to find necessary trust-points in a simple manner. However enabling them all by default, which allow any of the CAs to successfully MITM your TLS connections for any application using the bundles, (should) trigger some additional concerns and review. Right now there doesn't seem to be any distinction between the two cases above, and the Debian criteria looks effectively like accept-all. By "enabling" I mean including them in the global /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt bundle. Could Debian establish a set of criteria for which CAs to enable by default? One simple criteria could be that the CA supports Certificate Transparency and offer a public log of all their issued certificates, so that people can audit the CA and look for issued MITM certs like *.google.com or similar. We shouldn't cause user TLS certification errors needlessly as a consequence of a change like this. I suspect that the majority of end-entity certs would be covered by the well-known CAs that has supported Certificate Transparency for many years. Doing experiments with which CAs are important to enable by default could be done. Thoughts? /Simon
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
