On Sat, Jul 18, 2026 at 11:10:01 +0100, David Woodhouse wrote: > mozilla/certdata2pem.py inspects only CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH when deciding > whether to emit a root as a .crt file. Any root Mozilla marks as > CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST for TLS is silently dropped from the > ca-certificates output, even if Mozilla still marks it as > CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR for CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION or > CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING. > (CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING is always MUST_VERIFY_TRUST, so this is really only relevant for email at this point)
> Mozilla now uses this asymmetric trust state as its standard mechanism > for the *gradual retirement* of legacy roots (TLS distrusted first, > S/MIME and code-signing retained for a further period). Debian's > converter collapses that graceful retirement into a total removal, > silently breaking S/MIME verification for cert chains that Mozilla > explicitly still trusts. > The ca-certificates package is indeed not suitable for S/MIME verification. Bug #1107629 tracks creating a new package for that purpose. We'll probably need to decide on a location for these certs and the corresponding bundle (e.g. /etc/smime/certs?), and then have programs that do S/MIME verification start using that instead of /etc/ssl/certs. Cheers, Julien
