Source: dbus
Severity: normal
Tags: upstream security
X-Debbugs-Cc: Debian Security Team <[email protected]>
Forwarded: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/work_items/589

AISLE in partnership with Red Hat reported a local denial of service 
against `dbus-daemon --system`. A local attacker can prevent service 
activation (autostarting) by exhausting the maximum number of autostart 
requests that the bus allows, an arbitrary limit that was, ironically, 
implemented as an attempt to defend against denial of service. The 
attacker could use this to prevent system services from starting.

A mitigation is that the attack is only feasible if one of the 
installed, trusted system services (/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services) 
does not start successfully and reasonably promptly, or if one of those 
services can be made to exit by the attacker so that they can waste 
activation "slots" on starting it again.

Another mitigation is that a sysadmin can either start important 
services manually (or via their systemd units or init scripts, if any), 
or arrange for them to be autostarted before the attacker can block 
autostarting.

All versions are believed to be vulnerable. Unlike the other recent 
LLM-reported denial of service issues, there is no fixed version 
available yet for this one. Unfortunately, it was accidentally disclosed 
to the public when the reporter proposed a LLM-generated solution (which 
appears to be incorrect and does not prevent the denial of service).

I have added a SECURITY.md to dbus to try to take denial-of-service by 
resource exhaustion out-of-scope, because I do not believe that it is 
actually feasible to prevent all denial-of-service vulnerabilities of 
that type. I realise that this will not affect what the community 
demands from dbus' maintainers, so perhaps this will still be treated as 
a vulnerability, I don't know.

A CVE ID has been requested from Red Hat's CNA but is not yet available.

    smcv

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