Source: rust-hickory-proto Version: 0.26.3-1 X-Debbugs-CC: [email protected] Severity: grave Tags: security upstream
Hi, The following vulnerabilities were published for rust-hickory-proto. CVE-2026-123578[0]: | Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 and hickory-proto | 0.25.0 through 0.25.2 skip the check that a UDP response's question | section matches the query when the response has an empty question | section (QDCOUNT=0), and also skip the case-randomization check. | Remote attackers able to inject spoofed UDP responses can send | QDCOUNT=0 responses to bypass these checks, weakening defenses | against DNS spoofing. CVE-2026-123579[1]: | DNSSEC validation in Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before | 0.26.2 and hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 does not distinguish | NODATA responses from wildcard-expanded positive responses. For a | query that should return NODATA in a zone with wildcard records, an | attacker can combine an NSEC3 record matching the query name with a | signed wildcard record into a bogus positive response that | validation accepts. CVE-2026-123580[2]: | Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory- | proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 perform insufficient checks on NSEC3 | record names during DNSSEC verification, comparing only the hashed | label without confirming the record belongs to the correct zone. | Attackers can supply NSEC3 records from another zone with a matching | hash label to forge DNSSEC nonexistence proofs. CVE-2026-123581[3]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net | 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw that | accepts a response as a positive answer when any valid RRset appears | in the answer section, without checking that the RRset is responsive | to the query. Attackers can supply signed but unrelated RRsets so | that responses lacking matching records are validated as positive | answers instead of as no-data responses. CVE-2026-123590[4]: | Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory- | proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 accept NSEC and NSEC3 records for | DNSSEC nonexistence proofs when any other record with the same owner | name passes signature validation. Attackers able to supply DNS | responses can mix validly signed records with bogus same-name NSEC | or NSEC3 records of different types in the authority section to | forge nonexistence proofs. CVE-2026-123591[5]: | Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory- | proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 fail to verify, per RFC 6840 ยง4.4, that | an NSEC or NSEC3 record denying a DS RRset also proves the | delegation's NS record exists. Attackers can reuse child-side NSEC | or NSEC3 records to fake an insecure delegation and forge child-zone | records. CVE-2026-123593[6]: | Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory- | proto 0.24.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 compare DNSKEY public keys | against DNSSEC trust anchors without checking the DNSKEY record | name, so an RRset made up only of trusted keys is accepted without | RRSIG verification. Attackers able to spoof or control name server | responses can replace a secure zone's DNSKEY RRset with the root | zone's keys, and use a large TTL to keep it cached. CVE-2026-123594[7]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net | 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that | returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering | NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, | which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On- | path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed | NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to | accept forged nonexistence of the name. CVE-2026-123595[8]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory- | net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in | the validating recursor's NSEC3 handler, which matches the closest | encloser by hash alone without checking the type bitmap and so | accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC3 records as proof of | nonexistence. An attacker who delivers one response built from | genuinely signed parent NSEC3 records can cause NXDOMAIN or NODATA | to be cached with AD=1, denying resolution of existing names at and | below the zone cut. CVE-2026-123596[9]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net | 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the | validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side | ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names | below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or | attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged | NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, | causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for | the negative TTL. CVE-2026-123597[10]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.1 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and | hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a logic bug in DnssecDnsHandle's | DS-fetch path that caches transient DS lookup errors as Bogus DNSSEC | validation verdicts. An attacker who induces a SERVFAIL, REFUSED, or | timeout response to a child-zone DS sub-query causes the validator | to return SERVFAIL for all names under that zone until the cache | entry's TTL expires. CVE-2026-123599[11]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto before 0.26.0-beta.1 and hickory-net | before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because | verify_rrsets() ignores DNS class when partitioning RRsets, so non- | IN records skip signature verification yet are marked secure when | the IN records verify. Attackers able to supply DNS responses can | include forged CH or HS class records, including DS records, to | authenticate any DNSKEY and forge child zone responses. CVE-2026-123600[12]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.25.2 and hickory- | net 0.26.0-alpha.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in | DnssecDnsHandle that accepts NSEC3-signed NODATA responses for zone- | apex queries as secure without an NSEC3 record matching the hashed | QNAME. On-path attackers or malicious authoritative servers can | replay a validly signed non-apex NSEC3 with the zone's signed SOA to | serve an authenticated (AD=1) denial of any apex RRtype for the | negative-cache TTL. CVE-2026-123601[13]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory- | net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 invert the relational operators in | the wrap-around branch of find_covering_record() in nsec3.rs, so the | last NSEC3 record in a zone's hash ring covers every hash except its | owner. Attackers able to inject DNS responses can replay that NSEC3 | record and its RRSIG to forge DNSSEC-validated negative responses | denying legitimate names. CVE-2026-123605[14]: | Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net | before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the | validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name | appears in its Signer's Name field without checking that this name | is the zone containing the RRset. Attackers controlling any secure | zone can produce valid signatures over arbitrary records in | unrelated zones, which resolvers, recursors, and clients using | DnssecDnsHandle accept as authenticated. If you fix the vulnerabilities please also make sure to include the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures) ids in your changelog entry. For further information see: [0] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123578 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123578 [1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123579 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123579 [2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123580 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123580 [3] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123581 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123581 [4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123590 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123590 [5] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123591 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123591 [6] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123593 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123593 [7] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123594 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123594 [8] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123595 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123595 [9] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123596 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123596 [10] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123597 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123597 [11] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123599 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123599 [12] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123600 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123600 [13] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123601 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123601 [14] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123605 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123605 Regards, Salvatore

