Source: rust-hickory-proto
Version: 0.26.3-1
X-Debbugs-CC: [email protected]
Severity: grave
Tags: security upstream

Hi,

The following vulnerabilities were published for rust-hickory-proto.

CVE-2026-123578[0]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 and hickory-proto
| 0.25.0 through 0.25.2 skip the check that a UDP response's question
| section matches the query when the response has an empty question
| section (QDCOUNT=0), and also skip the case-randomization check.
| Remote attackers able to inject spoofed UDP responses can send
| QDCOUNT=0 responses to bypass these checks, weakening defenses
| against DNS spoofing.


CVE-2026-123579[1]:
| DNSSEC validation in Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before
| 0.26.2 and hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 does not distinguish
| NODATA responses from wildcard-expanded positive responses. For a
| query that should return NODATA in a zone with wildcard records, an
| attacker can combine an NSEC3 record matching the query name with a
| signed wildcard record into a bogus positive response that
| validation accepts.


CVE-2026-123580[2]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-
| proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 perform insufficient checks on NSEC3
| record names during DNSSEC verification, comparing only the hashed
| label without confirming the record belongs to the correct zone.
| Attackers can supply NSEC3 records from another zone with a matching
| hash label to forge DNSSEC nonexistence proofs.


CVE-2026-123581[3]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net
| 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw that
| accepts a response as a positive answer when any valid RRset appears
| in the answer section, without checking that the RRset is responsive
| to the query. Attackers can supply signed but unrelated RRsets so
| that responses lacking matching records are validated as positive
| answers instead of as no-data responses.


CVE-2026-123590[4]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-
| proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 accept NSEC and NSEC3 records for
| DNSSEC nonexistence proofs when any other record with the same owner
| name passes signature validation. Attackers able to supply DNS
| responses can mix validly signed records with bogus same-name NSEC
| or NSEC3 records of different types in the authority section to
| forge nonexistence proofs.


CVE-2026-123591[5]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-
| proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 fail to verify, per RFC 6840 ยง4.4, that
| an NSEC or NSEC3 record denying a DS RRset also proves the
| delegation's NS record exists. Attackers can reuse child-side NSEC
| or NSEC3 records to fake an insecure delegation and forge child-zone
| records.


CVE-2026-123593[6]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-
| proto 0.24.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 compare DNSKEY public keys
| against DNSSEC trust anchors without checking the DNSKEY record
| name, so an RRset made up only of trusted keys is accepted without
| RRSIG verification. Attackers able to spoof or control name server
| responses can replace a secure zone's DNSKEY RRset with the root
| zone's keys, and use a large TTL to keep it cached.


CVE-2026-123594[7]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net
| 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that
| returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering
| NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name,
| which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-
| path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed
| NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to
| accept forged nonexistence of the name.


CVE-2026-123595[8]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-
| net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in
| the validating recursor's NSEC3 handler, which matches the closest
| encloser by hash alone without checking the type bitmap and so
| accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC3 records as proof of
| nonexistence. An attacker who delivers one response built from
| genuinely signed parent NSEC3 records can cause NXDOMAIN or NODATA
| to be cached with AD=1, denying resolution of existing names at and
| below the zone cut.


CVE-2026-123596[9]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net
| 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the
| validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side
| ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names
| below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or
| attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged
| NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records,
| causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for
| the negative TTL.


CVE-2026-123597[10]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.1 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and
| hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a logic bug in DnssecDnsHandle's
| DS-fetch path that caches transient DS lookup errors as Bogus DNSSEC
| validation verdicts. An attacker who induces a SERVFAIL, REFUSED, or
| timeout response to a child-zone DS sub-query causes the validator
| to return SERVFAIL for all names under that zone until the cache
| entry's TTL expires.


CVE-2026-123599[11]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto before 0.26.0-beta.1 and hickory-net
| before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because
| verify_rrsets() ignores DNS class when partitioning RRsets, so non-
| IN records skip signature verification yet are marked secure when
| the IN records verify. Attackers able to supply DNS responses can
| include forged CH or HS class records, including DS records, to
| authenticate any DNSKEY and forge child zone responses.


CVE-2026-123600[12]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.25.2 and hickory-
| net 0.26.0-alpha.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in
| DnssecDnsHandle that accepts NSEC3-signed NODATA responses for zone-
| apex queries as secure without an NSEC3 record matching the hashed
| QNAME. On-path attackers or malicious authoritative servers can
| replay a validly signed non-apex NSEC3 with the zone's signed SOA to
| serve an authenticated (AD=1) denial of any apex RRtype for the
| negative-cache TTL.


CVE-2026-123601[13]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-
| net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 invert the relational operators in
| the wrap-around branch of find_covering_record() in nsec3.rs, so the
| last NSEC3 record in a zone's hash ring covers every hash except its
| owner. Attackers able to inject DNS responses can replay that NSEC3
| record and its RRSIG to forge DNSSEC-validated negative responses
| denying legitimate names.


CVE-2026-123605[14]:
| Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net
| before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the
| validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name
| appears in its Signer's Name field without checking that this name
| is the zone containing the RRset. Attackers controlling any secure
| zone can produce valid signatures over arbitrary records in
| unrelated zones, which resolvers, recursors, and clients using
| DnssecDnsHandle accept as authenticated.


If you fix the vulnerabilities please also make sure to include the
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures) ids in your changelog entry.

For further information see:

[0] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123578
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123578
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123579
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123579
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123580
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123580
[3] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123581
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123581
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123590
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123590
[5] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123591
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123591
[6] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123593
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123593
[7] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123594
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123594
[8] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123595
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123595
[9] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123596
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123596
[10] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123597
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123597
[11] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123599
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123599
[12] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123600
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123600
[13] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123601
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123601
[14] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123605
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123605

Regards,
Salvatore

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