Source: libjson-xs-perl
Version: 4.040-1
X-Debbugs-CC: [email protected]
Severity: important
Tags: security upstream

Hi,

The following vulnerabilities were published for libjson-xs-perl.

CVE-2026-124536[0]:
| JSON::XS versions before 4.05 for Perl allow memory exhaustion by
| buffering incremental input past max_size after a NUL byte in
| incr_parse.  The parser appends each chunk to its buffer and
| compares max_size with how far it has progressed, not with the
| buffer length. It treats a NUL byte as the end of the input, so a
| NUL within the first max_size bytes keeps it short of the limit. The
| buffer keeps growing, and incr_skip cannot remove the NUL.  A peer
| streaming data to an incr_parse consumer can exhaust process memory
| regardless of max_size.


CVE-2026-124539[1]:
| JSON::XS versions before 4.05 for Perl leak the decoded key of an
| object rejected for a missing colon in decode_hv.  Unless it is
| short plain ASCII, a quoted key is decoded into a new scalar.
| Nothing frees that scalar when the object is rejected for a missing
| ':' after the key.  A process that keeps running after a failed
| decode retains one key per rejected document, with its size chosen
| by the sender. Repeated requests exhaust process memory.


CVE-2026-124540[2]:
| JSON::XS versions before 4.05 for Perl allow stack exhaustion via
| nested tagged values under allow_tags in decode_tag.  With
| allow_tags, "(" starts a tagged value. Its tag and value are decoded
| recursively, and each can start another tagged value. Unlike arrays
| and objects, this nesting is not counted against max_depth.  A run
| of "(" bytes exhausts the C stack and triggers an uncatchable
| segmentation fault regardless of max_depth.


CVE-2026-124541[3]:
| JSON::XS versions before 4.05 for Perl leak the decoded part of a
| rejected long string in decode_str.  A string is decoded through a
| fixed-size buffer (16 KiB in 4.04), and each time the buffer fills
| its contents move into a new scalar. Nothing frees that scalar when
| the string is then rejected for a control character, an invalid
| escape, malformed UTF-8 or the end of the input.  A process that
| keeps running after a failed decode retains the decoded part of each
| rejected string, with its size chosen by the sender. Repeated
| requests exhaust process memory.


CVE-2026-129113[4]:
| JSON::XS versions from 4.0_00 before 4.05 for Perl corrupt the
| incremental buffer length by chopping past its end in incr_skip
| after a top-level number.  The incremental parser scans any run of
| digits, signs, dots and exponent markers as one number, but the
| decoder stops at the end of a valid number, so the parser keeps an
| offset into bytes it has not decoded. It then empties the buffer
| without clearing those bytes, and a later incr_parse call without
| new input reads them again and moves the offset past the end of the
| buffer. incr_skip, the documented recovery after an error, removes
| that many bytes and the buffer length wraps.  A peer sending input
| such as "1-2" to an incr_parse consumer can make the next read of
| incr_text exit the process through perl's uncatchable out-of-memory
| path.


CVE-2026-129114[5]:
| JSON::XS versions from 3.04 before 4.05 for Perl write one byte past
| a heap buffer when appending a one-byte chunk in incr_parse.  The
| incremental buffer grows to one and a half times the length it must
| hold, with no room reserved for the terminating NUL. For an empty
| buffer and a one-byte chunk that request is one byte, which a buffer
| whose front was removed by earlier decodes can already have, so
| nothing is reallocated and the NUL lands one byte past the
| allocation.  A peer streaming data to an incr_parse consumer,
| choosing how the input is split into reads, can cause a one-byte
| heap out-of-bounds write.


CVE-2026-129115[6]:
| JSON::XS versions from 3.0 before 4.05 for Perl read freed stack
| memory when a FREEZE result's serialisation grows the Perl stack
| under allow_tags in encode_rv.  With allow_tags, an object's FREEZE
| method is called in list context and each returned value is encoded
| through a saved Perl stack pointer. When encoding a returned value
| calls back into Perl, through TO_JSON under convert_blessed or
| another FREEZE, and that callback grows the stack, the stack is
| reallocated while the saved pointer still refers to the freed block.
| Encoding such objects reads freed memory, and encode can return
| undef without an error.


If you fix the vulnerabilities please also make sure to include the
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures) ids in your changelog entry.

For further information see:

[0] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-124536
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-124536
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-124539
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-124539
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-124540
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-124540
[3] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-124541
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-124541
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-129113
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129113
[5] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-129114
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129114
[6] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-129115
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129115

Regards,
Salvatore

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