Ben Hutchings wrote:
> On Mon, 2008-04-07 at 10:30 +0200, Géraud Meyer wrote:
>   
>> Ben Hutchings wrote:
>>     
>>> This is not a security hole.
>>>       
>>   If you can modify a user's ~/.fehbg you
>>     
>>> can almost certainly edit other shell scripts in the user's home
>>>   
>>>       
>> feh alone can modify  ~/.fehbg. The user changing a wallpaper won't
>> notice that malicious code could be put in his home dir since fehbg is
>> only supposed to change the background, not to interpret code inside
>> filenames. feh does not modify other scripts, though a script in a
>> filename processed by feh could.
>>     
>
> However, the user has to take a series of positive actions for an
> exploit to succeed: they must modify their session script, open the
> specific image, and set it as background.
>   
Modifying the session script is recommended by the man page! This is the
normal procedure to have the wallpaper restored at starup of the X session.
Yes the user has to take positive actions as is the case for most of
exploits that are not network related.
>   
>>> directory too.  Furthermore, while it is possible for feh to write a
>>> destructive command to ~/.fehbg, it is extremely unlikely that a user
>>> will make it do so accidentally.
>>>   
>>>       
>> Firstly the user may not choose the filename of the image file, for
>> example in case it was sent to him/her by email.
>>     
>
> Of course.  But the filename is visible to the user, is it not?
>   
> I suppose this is a security hole, but since it requires positive
> actions by the user (unlike, say, exploiting creation of temporary files
> which the user is not aware of) I don't believe it is grave.
>   
The user is not aware of the bug of feh so that even if he/she notices
the odd filename -- and an average user of a graphical application is
not supposed to recognize a shell script -- setting it as a wallpaper is
still safe to his/her knowledge.
Exploiting creation of temporary files is very similar to this weakness.
As I understand it you mean that since this bug is so obviously a
security issue, it should not be because everybody should identify the
weakness and stop action!
> Ben.
>
>   

Still not convinced.



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