Your message dated Tue, 16 Dec 2025 16:49:40 +0000
with message-id <[email protected]>
and subject line Bug#1123069: fixed in dropbear 2025.89-1
has caused the Debian Bug report #1123069,
regarding CVE-2025-14282: privilege escalation via unix stream socket forwarding
to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

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-- 
1123069: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1123069
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact [email protected] with problems
--- Begin Message ---
Source: dropbear
Version: 2025.88-2
Severity: grave
Justification: user security hole
Tags: security upstream
X-Debbugs-Cc: Debian Security Team <[email protected]>

Dropbear upstream has recently released 2025.89 [0] which fixes
the following vulnerability [1]:

| Privilege escalation via unix stream forwarding in Dropbear server.
| Other programs on a system may authenticate unix sockets via
| SO_PEERCRED, which would be root user for Dropbear forwarded
| connections, allowing root privilege escalation.
|
| Reported by Turistu, and thanks for advice on the fix.
|
| This is tracked as CVE-2025-14282, and affects 2024.84 to 2025.88.
|
| It is fixed by dropping privileges of the dropbear process after
| authentication. Unix stream sockets are now disallowed when a
| forced command is used, either with authorized_key restrictions or
| "dropbear -c command".
|
| In previous affected releases running with "dropbear -j" (will also
| disable TCP fowarding) or building with
| localoptions.h/distrooptions.h "#define DROPBEAR_SVR_LOCALSTREAMFWD
| 0" is a mitigation.
|
| The full fix of dropping privileges requires the commits in
| https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/391
| https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/394
|
| Unix socket forwarding is now disabled when forced command options
| are used, since it could bypass command restrictions.
| This isn't directly related to the privilege escalation, but could
| allow arbitrary commands to be run as the correct user.

-- 
Guilhem.

[0] https://lists.ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au/pipermail/dropbear/2025q4/002390.html
[1] https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2025/q4/279

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--- Begin Message ---
Source: dropbear
Source-Version: 2025.89-1
Done: Guilhem Moulin <[email protected]>

We believe that the bug you reported is fixed in the latest version of
dropbear, which is due to be installed in the Debian FTP archive.

A summary of the changes between this version and the previous one is
attached.

Thank you for reporting the bug, which will now be closed.  If you
have further comments please address them to [email protected],
and the maintainer will reopen the bug report if appropriate.

Debian distribution maintenance software
pp.
Guilhem Moulin <[email protected]> (supplier of updated dropbear package)

(This message was generated automatically at their request; if you
believe that there is a problem with it please contact the archive
administrators by mailing [email protected])


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Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 17:14:59 +0100
Source: dropbear
Architecture: source
Version: 2025.89-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: high
Maintainer: Guilhem Moulin <[email protected]>
Changed-By: Guilhem Moulin <[email protected]>
Closes: 1123069
Changes:
 dropbear (2025.89-1) unstable; urgency=high
 .
   * New upstream security and bugfix release (closes: #1123069).
     + Fix CVE-2025-14282: Privilege escalation via unix stream forwarding in
       Dropbear server. Other programs on a system may authenticate unix
       sockets via SO_PEERCRED, which would be root user for Dropbear forwarded
       connections, allowing root privilege escalation.
     + Unix stream sockets are now disallowed when a forced command is used,
       either with authorized_key restrictions or "dropbear -c command".
     + The server now drops privileges of the dropbear process after
       authentication.
     + Remote server TCP socket forwarding will now use OS privileged port
       restrictions rather than having a fixed "allow >=1024 for non-root"
       rule.
   * d/control: Remove `Rules-Requires-Root: no`.
   * d/s/lintian-overrides: Drop unused override.
   * d/watch: Port to Version 5.
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