Hi,
I've isolated the patch that includes the security fix. This security
fix is already in testing, so this bug only affects sarge.
Daniel
--- wv-1.2.2/lfo.c 2005-04-17 22:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ wv-1.2.4/lfo.c 2006-10-20 02:48:47.000000000 +0100
@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@
followed by its corresponding LVL structure (if LFOLVL.fFormatting is set).
*/
+static int
+multiplication_will_overflow(U32 a, U32 b)
+{
+ if((a > 0) && (b > 0) && (G_MAXUINT / a) >= b) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int
wvGetLFO_records (LFO ** lfo, LFOLVL ** lfolvl, LVL ** lvl, U32 * nolfo,
U32 * nooflvl, U32 offset, U32 len, wvStream * fd)
@@ -49,7 +59,9 @@
wvTrace (("pos %x %d\n", wvStream_tell (fd), *nooflvl));
wvTrace (("nolfo is %d nooflvl is %d\n", *nolfo, *nooflvl));
- if (*nooflvl == 0)
+ if ((*nooflvl == 0) ||
+ multiplication_will_overflow(sizeof (LFOLVL), *nooflvl) ||
+ multiplication_will_overflow(sizeof (LVL), *nooflvl))
{
*lfolvl = NULL;
*lvl = NULL;
@@ -101,16 +113,22 @@
*nolfo = read_32ubit (fd);
wvTrace (("%d\n", *nolfo));
- *lfo = (LFO *) wvMalloc (*nolfo * sizeof (LFO));
- if (*lfo == NULL)
- {
- wvError (
- ("NO MEM 1, failed to alloc %d bytes\n",
+ /* check for integer overflow */
+ if (multiplication_will_overflow(*nolfo, sizeof(LFO))) {
+ wvError (("Malicious document!\n"));
+ *nolfo = 0;
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ *lfo = (LFO *) wvMalloc (*nolfo * sizeof(LFO));
+ if (*lfo == NULL)
+ {
+ wvError (("NO MEM 1, failed to alloc %d bytes\n",
*nolfo * sizeof (LFO)));
return (1);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < *nolfo; i++)
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < *nolfo; i++)
wvGetLFO (&((*lfo)[i]), fd);
+ }
}
return (0);
}