-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:33:04 +0100
Source: imagemagick
Architecture: source
Version: 8:7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4
Distribution: trixie
Urgency: high
Maintainer: ImageMagick Packaging Team 
<[email protected]>
Changed-By: Bastien Roucariès <[email protected]>
Closes: 1119296 1122584 1122827
Changes:
 imagemagick (8:7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4) trixie; urgency=high
 .
   * Fix CVE-2025-62594 (Closes: #1119296)
     Imagemagick is vulnerable to denial-of-service due to unsigned integer
     underflow and division-by-zero in the CLAHEImage function. When tile
     width or height is zero, unsigned underflow occurs in pointer
     arithmetic, leading to out-of-bounds memory access, and
     division-by-zero causes immediate crashes.
   * Fix CVE-2025-65955 (Closes: #1122827)
     There is a vulnerability in ImageMagick’s Magick++ layer that
     manifests when Options::fontFamily is invoked with an empty
     string. Clearing a font family calls RelinquishMagickMemory on
     _drawInfo->font, freeing the font string but leaving _drawInfo->font
     pointing to freed memory while _drawInfo->family is set to that
     (now-invalid) pointer. Any later cleanup or reuse of _drawInfo->font
     re-frees or dereferences dangling memory. DestroyDrawInfo and other
     setters (Options::font, Image::font) assume _drawInfo->font remains
     valid, so destruction or subsequent updates trigger crashes or heap
     corruption.
   * Fix CVE-2025-66628 (Closes: #1122584)
     The TIM (PSX TIM) image parser contains a critical integer overflow
     vulnerability in its ReadTIMImage function (coders/tim.c). The code
     reads width and height (16-bit values) from the file header and
     calculates image_size = 2 * width * height without checking for
     overflow. On 32-bit systems (or where size_t is 32-bit), this
     calculation can overflow if width and height are large (e.g., 65535),
     wrapping around to a small value.
   * Fix CVE-2025-68618:
     Magick's failure to limit the depth of SVG file reads caused
     a DoS attack.
   * Do not allow vid for vector graphics
   * Fix CVE-2025-68950:
     Magick's failure to limit MVG mutual references forming a loop
   * Fix CVE-2025-69204:
     Converting a malicious MVG file to SVG caused an integer overflow.
Checksums-Sha1:
 1a140b665fbc9edc6e00bf33f884e4aedf2cd997 5136 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4.dsc
 103af0af388a733c043845b228cf3031c16d859b 10501740 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1.orig.tar.xz
 b3eb17ff9d26843ad463a8ce8179e79723a6f874 288996 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4.debian.tar.xz
 33d8c99351aaf649b1f77c640f49ca7439404542 8270 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4_source.buildinfo
Checksums-Sha256:
 9913957b585bd2e91968912b41a74b52d496c332f1342be670de2afd91d5c091 5136 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4.dsc
 bcb4f3c78a930a608fa4889f889edbcb384974246ad9407fce1858f2c0607bfe 10501740 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1.orig.tar.xz
 52a6658222229e073106de16919e39e84ee0b441b11ea1ee557e7775ba40c97d 288996 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4.debian.tar.xz
 4d32c1bb791c0ae3ddb157f0304c0b75f8cfc2282f46a9ca50d8a9727492886e 8270 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4_source.buildinfo
Files:
 92be380e1be6a428dceee7880bd378c3 5136 graphics optional 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4.dsc
 01cfb13a7c1813afb50790e431358c6c 10501740 graphics optional 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1.orig.tar.xz
 790670e5bec04c4d38f525e47952892e 288996 graphics optional 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4.debian.tar.xz
 4ef673b9e5eae2de82bb6712d41a1082 8270 graphics optional 
imagemagick_7.1.1.43+dfsg1-1+deb13u4_source.buildinfo

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=kLf2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Attachment: pgpL0wTSZwxmN.pgp
Description: PGP signature

Reply via email to