This snippet might be of use. This is what I use on my general
'all-users' group, to keep any users not specified out of my s3 ops
bucket with some private keys in it. You specify the blessed users by
IAM user ID, and everyone else is denied. I assume you could use a
similar pattern on other services, though obviously you'd need to test
it out. I combine this with my MFA policy, so it's applied to all
meatspace users 'by default'.
WIth this snippet, I can give a user 'global read-only' to our s3
buckets and still block them from thse buckets. The only downside is
that when a privileged user leaves, you have to remember to remove the
ID (though if you're disabling their user anyway, that's not much of an
issue...).
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": "s3:*",
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:s3:::my-ops-private-bucket",
"arn:aws:s3:::my-ops-private-bucket/*",
"arn:aws:s3:::my-ops-backups-bucket",
"arn:aws:s3:::my-ops-backups-bucket/*"
],
"Condition": {
"StringNotLike": {
"aws:userId": [
"AIDAxxxxAdminStaffer1",
"AIDAxxxxAdminStaffer2",
"AIDAxxxxAdminStaffer3"
]
}
}
}
]
}
On 11/08/17 00:28, James Bromberger wrote:
The only down side of this would be any secrets stored in any SSM
Parameter Store locations, but at this point in time I don't think
three are any; historically, people would store secrets into S3
buckets (probably client-side encrypted, definitely server side
encrypted). These secrets could be locked down to being accessible to
only specific IP ranges, and now to specific VPCs (see VPC Endpoints,
specifically S3 Endpoints). Again, I don't think we're doing that.
I was trying a few years ago to have SAML federation, but no one
seemed interested. Hence we have local users, and we've enforced MFA
for all.
You'll find there are "Managed Policies' for "read-only", which are
updated as a managed service to reflect read-only as new permissions
and services are added. Note that any DENY policies win, so a
combination of a managed Read Only everything, with DENY on SSM
ParameterStore GetParameters [1] is probably enough.
Not that for IAM itself, you would be able to list API access key IDs,
but never the Access key secrets (These are never re-issued).
I wouldn't go as far as making this visible to people outside of DDs.
[1]
|{ "Effect": "Deny", "Action": [ "ssm:GetParameters" ], "Resource":
"/|arn:aws:ssm:*:DIGITSHERE:parameter/*|/" }|
On 10/08/2017 4:44 PM, Bastian Blank wrote:
Hi
On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 08:28:44AM +0100, kuLa wrote:
I'm recently fiddling a lot with permissions on the Debian AWS account and it's
been pointed to me that it's worth considering updating IAM settings a bit.
Having above in mind and that DDs are already trusted enough :-) I'm thinking
about giving a full RO to all DDs which are having access to the AWS account.
What are the people thoughts about this?
I was the one bringing this up. In the beginning I just wanted to see
what real world AWS IAM policies look like and maybe learn a little
about that permission system. This would also enable me to provide
complete patches if modifications are necessary.
I started with trying to access this information using the web interface
and every time a new required permission kept popping up. The current
workflow of granting read permissions one by one does not really scale.
So I asked the question if there are informations and services inside
this account that are so secret that fellow DD would be not allowed to
read them.
Regards,
Bastian
