Summary / Proposal: To solve the growing issue of supply-chain attacks and the infrastructure deficit facing independent core distributions (Gentoo, Debian, Arch, Alpine, etc.), we propose a unified Multi-Signature (Threshold Cryptography) Release Protocol for upstream kernels and base releases.
Core Principles: 1. Upstream Consensus Only: The master signing keys for official kernel/system releases are split strictly among independent upstream maintainers (Linus/Kernel Core + Debian, Gentoo, Arch, Alpine, etc.). Downstream commercial derivatives (e.g., Ubuntu, ChromeOS) hold no master keys. 2. Cross-Verification Safety: No patch or release is officially signed until all independent keyholders validate it through their native build and testing pipelines. This drastically reduces zero-day backdoors (cross-audit model). 3. Infrastructure Rate-Limiting: If any single upstream core project lacks the physical server infrastructure to run complete validation builds, the signing process naturally pauses for all parties until hardware resources are allocated. 4. GPL Compliance: Code remains 100% open source under GPL. The protocol merely strictly controls the cryptographic stamp of official upstream authenticity. This shifts the balance of supply-chain security back to independent upstream projects, ensuring corporate entities adequately support every link of the core infrastructure chain they rely on. --- Implementation Note: Everything needed for this implementation is already written, debugged, and running on millions of servers worldwide: - Cryptographic tools (GPG, threshold signatures, multisig) have existed for decades. - Build and repository infrastructure is already established in every distribution. - Core trust mechanisms (verification of module and image digital signatures) are already built into Linux.
