quick question: does anyone know if *older* (prior) debian *Release* files are stored in any *signed* debian package such that a chain of provenance of all packages and all versions could be traced?
the only alternative way is reconstruction that would be successful if and only if the entire history of debian mirroring of every Release/InRelease file ever created can somehow be recovered. i have not been able to find evidence of chained Release providence tracing, and it is an oversight on my part from the original Web-of-Trust analysis done in 2017. https://gitlab.com/d12rg/wot/-/blob/master/papers/wot/wot.tex l. On Monday, November 16, 2026, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton <[email protected]> wrote: > this is a little complex to explain, and please be patient and strictly > follow debian community guidelines, as i have had strokes and now am forced > to use AIs in a symbiotic fashion. below is > written *without* their assistance. > > repo first, explanation second, motto at the end: > https://gitlab.com/d12rg/wot/ > > about 25 years ago i envisaged debian being fully peer-distributed. not > dependent on any domain hosting in any way, the entire process of debian > development could hypothetically be done via TCP/CP using git (bundles via > Carrier Pigeon) or a true peer-to-peer git transport [not to be confused > with pushing to a server, i do mean e.g. pushing git bundles to a > bittorrent network and linking SHA256 commits directly into its Kademlia > DHT] > > in addition to that, many people will have seen how badly windows .EXE > provenance goes (the windows 95 sheep screensaver wrapped in malware was my > favourite) and a plethora of linux distros are blissfully unaware of the > deeply impressive provenance, documentation, rigor, and... i run out of > superlatives - i got up to 18 hard requirements and listed how every > distribution but debian fails them: > http://lkcl.net/reports/wot/ > > in addition to *that* if there is a *non-debian* or > even non-distro aim to distribute, for example, the > source latex of arxiv.org peer reviewed academic > journals, and have each PDF built as a binary > package and the latex as source, where the > Citations are mapped to package dependencies > and - this is the kicker - the distribution does NOT > end up messing with /var/lib/apt etc but can be > placed into an ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT location > of the user's choice... > > this is where the research project i am putting together kicks in. > > the goal is to then link the entire thing together behind fully > peer-to-peer infrastructure. apt-swarm is a candidate however that does not > help with the other aspects: peer-distribution of GPG keyring signing and > Identity verification protocols, whom do you trust when the entire > provenance is peer-distributable, even to the point of allowing you to > choose whom *you* trust as ftp-masters, *and* which "Releases" - quantity > multiple - you accept. > > remember that in this scenario there will NOT be one single > /etc/apt/sources.list[.d] there will be *MULTIPLE* $(repo[nnnnnn])/etc/apt/ > sources.list[.d] > of *your* choice for *your* chosen purpose(s), every single one of them > fully decentralised, peer-distributable, the number of top-level Release > files is not in any way limited (and can go directly into a DHT *and* have > apt search keywords associated with it) > > yet still fulfilling the hard requirements that gives debian its > near-invulnerable reputation to provenance attack. > > the first stage - self-bootstrap - is already complete. the scripts can > automatically package themselves up as a debian package, install and set > themselves up under an arbitrary directory, set up a debian pool mirror > ready for actual distribution, and can then be installed AGAIN from that > mirror and re-built or installed again, in order to perform gcc-style > bootstrap self-checking (does the compiler compile itself 3x in a chain and > produce identical binaries?) > > the second stage is to introduce apt-swarm and separate out packages for > the documentation and associated papers, set up reproducible builds and > tests for use of apt-mirror and other hosting options, sort out the gpg > keyring peer distribution. > > a third stage is to establish a rigorous set of hostile attack vectors, > actively seeking to shred the entire system and make it fall over. > > i would welcome feedback and assistance, this is a fascinating > meta-meta-project that solves a particularly complex provenance and > reproducability problem on moving target(s). > > until otherwise established a mailing list is here: > https://groups.google.com/g/d12rg > > one particular question i would love to hear from people: i suggested > putting the entirety of arxiv.org source and PDFs into debian archive > form: what would *you* use this for? software project management of > releases, even those from Visual Studio or Eclipse or Arduino? ERM or other > Sales Force Management of customer contracts? a type of blockchain which > goes well beyond Ethereum? what else? > > the motto, if you have seen mythbusters, is to use [software] tools for > purposes for which they were never originally intended. back-to-back. and > not as a rube goldberg machine. > > l. > > > > -- > --- > geometry: without it life is pointless > the fibonacci series: easy as 1 1 2 3 > we are humans and can make mistakes > > -- --- geometry: without it life is pointless the fibonacci series: easy as 1 1 2 3 we are humans and can make mistakes

