On Mon, 26 Feb 2024 14:45:19 +0100 Julian Andres Klode <j...@debian.org> wrote: > Source: linux > Severity: normal > X-Debbugs-Cc: j...@debian.org > > In https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1040901 I asked you > to switch to an ephemeral key which was a misunderstanding from a > discussion with xnox, which we still need to sort out fully. > > Please either document how the buildds ensure that > > - private key generation has enough, and high quality enough, entropy > - private keys are safely erased after not being needed anymore > > or revert to signing modules with the CA key and use MODVERSIONS > and co to ensure that modules built for one ABI cannot be used > with another. > > I need to update the question in shim-review accordingly, I think > I never reverted it or adjusted it, but it will likely take the > form of the previous three paragraphs. > > I sincerely apologize for causing this misunderstanding.
Are those really that hard of a problem to solve? Running any modern kernel entropy shouldn't be an issue, certainly not on controlled environment like the buildds - if an attacker has complete control of the buildds environment, then we can pack up and go home, given the kernel build is not reproducible. And likewise key handling could be done in a non-swappable tmpfs tied to the lifetime of the build process via a namespace, that ought to be enough for peace of mind? Using an ephemeral key makes things so much simpler and nicer and quicker at signing time, and so much simpler to reason about. One kernel, one set of modules, and that's it. -- Kind regards, Luca Boccassi
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