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Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2024 22:59:52 +0100
Source: icinga2
Architecture: source
Version: 2.12.3-1+deb11u1
Distribution: bullseye-security
Urgency: medium
Maintainer: Debian Nagios Maintainer Group 
<[email protected]>
Changed-By: Daniel Leidert <[email protected]>
Closes: 991494 1087384
Changes:
 icinga2 (2.12.3-1+deb11u1) bullseye-security; urgency=medium
 .
   * Non-maintainer upload by the Debian LTS Team.
   * d/patches/CVE-2021-32739.patch: Fix for CVE-2021-32739 (closes: #991494).
     - From version 2.4.0 through version 2.12.4, a vulnerability exists that
       may allow privilege escalation for authenticated API users. With a
       read-only user's credentials, an attacker can view most attributes of
       all config objects including `ticket_salt` of `ApiListener`. This salt
       is enough to compute a ticket for every possible common name (CN). A
       ticket, the master node's certificate, and a self-signed certificate are
       enough to successfully request the desired certificate from Icinga. That
       certificate may in turn be used to steal an endpoint or API user's
       identity.
   * d/patches/CVE-2021-32743.patch: Fix for CVE-2021-32743 (closes: #991494).
     - In versions prior to 2.11.10 and from version 2.12.0 through version
       2.12.4, some of the Icinga 2 features that require credentials for
       external services expose those credentials through the API to
       authenticated API users with read permissions for the corresponding
       object types. An attacker who obtains these credentials can impersonate
       Icinga to these services and add, modify and delete information there.
   * d/patches/CVE-2021-37698-1.patch, d/patches/CVE-2021-37698-2.patch,
     d/patches/CVE-2021-37698-3.patch, d/patches/CVE-2021-37698-4.patch,
     d/patches/CVE-2021-37698-5.patch: Set of fixes for CVE-2021-37698.
     - In versions 2.5.0 through 2.13.0, ElasticsearchWriter, GelfWriter,
       InfluxdbWriter and Influxdb2Writer do not verify the server's certificate
       despite a certificate authority being specified. Icinga 2 instances which
       connect to any of the mentioned time series databases (TSDBs) using TLS
       over a spoofable infrastructure should change the credentials (if any)
       used by the TSDB writer feature to authenticate against the TSDB.
   * d/patches/CVE-2024-49369.patch: Fix for CVE-2024-49369 (closes: #1087384).
     - The TLS certificate validation in all Icinga 2 versions starting from
       2.4.0 was flawed, allowing an attacker to impersonate both trusted
       cluster nodes as well as any API users that use TLS client certificates
       for authentication (ApiUser objects with the client_cn attribute set).
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