Hi, On 04/03/2019 17:37, Sylvain Beucler wrote: > On 04/03/2019 16:55, Markus Koschany wrote: >> Am 04.03.19 um 16:33 schrieb Sylvain Beucler: >> [...] >>> I see this as a strong signal that we should not attempt to backport the >>> fix, and go with a <no-dsa> (minor). >>> >>> Alternatively we could upgrade nettle (libnettle4->libnettle6) which >>> doesn't break gnutls28's test suite, though it's likely to introduce >>> other issues (e.g. #789119). >>> >>> Thoughts? >> I also worked on nettle/gnutls26 for Wheezy. There are too many changes >> and just backporting rsa_sec_decrypt in nettle would be an incomplete >> fix for CVE-2018-16869 because they introduced more hardening against >> those side-channel attacks in other functions. An upgrade of nettle >> would require a rebuild of all reverse-dependencies and that is probably >> too intrusive. > > Thanks for your input Markus. > > Instead of upgrading I was thinking of providing libnettle6 /in addition > to/ libnettle4, but that still sounds like more troubles than it solves.
(and indeed, when testing gnutls28+libnettle6, "git clone" now fails.) # git clone https://github.com/symfony/symfony-installer Clonage dans 'symfony-installer'... fatal: unable to access 'https://github.com/symfony/symfony-installer/': gnutls_handshake() failed: Public key signature verification has failed. Also, the stable security team didn't answer my mail but reached the same conclusion (<no-dsa> minor). I'll mark these CVE-s as <no-dsa> and fix the CVE/list incomplete assessment. Cheers! Sylvain
