Josip Rodin writes ("Social Committee proposal text (diff), updated"):
> [stuff]Josip's proposal is radically different from mine in two orthogonal ways. The first one, which we have been arguing about a bit so far, is that he proposes that we establish the SC as a constitutional body. However, there is another perhaps even more important class of differences: his proposed SC's powers and processes are completely different from mine. The main differences, with which I strongly disagree, are: * Josip models the SC's powers on those of the TC. This is wholly inappropriate because the questions that the SC is required to deal with are very different. * Josip models the SC's procedures on those of the TC. Again, this is not appropriate. * Josip's text emphasises the SC's role as a writer of policies. We do not need policies, we need admonishment and if necessary enforcement of good conduct. * Josip's text depends heavily on the meaning of the word `social' which I think is vague to the point of uselessness and will lead to jurisdictional disputes. The most important question is: what should the SC to ultimately _do_ ? What the TC ultimately does is authorise an NMU, if a maintainer won't cooperate, or even to decree a new maintainer. If the SC gives advice and is ignored, what _power_ should it have ? The answer is obvious: we want the SC to impose mailing list bans (and IRC bans and wiki bans and so forth). That single power is enough to do everything that is lacking, because together with the threat and expectation of its exercise, the SC can enforce good behaviour. At the moment the DPL and the mailing list admins have that power but usually decline to exercise it (because they have other fish to fry). The power to ban (temporarily or permanently) is what should be spelled out in the SC's charter. The next most obvious thing I wanted is to demolish the analogy between the TC and the SC. The job of the TC and that of the proposed SC are quite different. Technical disagreements are objective and can be clearly explained. It is often possible for people to retain clear respect for each other even as they disagree vigorously on some technical matter. Bringing a matter to the TC is much less of an accusation of wrongdoing: even bright, reasonable and well-informed people may discuss a matter and find themselves at ultimately odds over how something shoudl be done; if the question is nontrivial then they might each amicably agree to bring it to the TC. If you `lose' during a TC arbitration that doesn't necessarily imply that you did anything wrong. On-topic discussions of technical questions are productive and useful, and a narrow field of contributors to such a question is harmful. Part of the purpose of Debian is to allow such conversations to flower. Developers should not feel inhibited about disagreeing with each other in public on a technical level. It is universally acknolwedged that voting on technical questions is a bad way of making decisions and also widely believed that popularity of a developer is not a good guide to technical excellence. `Social' disagreements are quite different. They are subjective and sometimes difficult to explain. Normal and reasonable people should generally be able to get along without the intervention of the SC; so the intervention of the SC (whether necessarily requested or not) is always a rebuke, if the SC decides against you. Vigorous and strong disagreement about matters of appropriate behaviour usually lead to strong negative opinions on both sides. Public discussions of disagreements about standards of conduct are nearly always fruitless if at all extended. Debian's purposes do not include experimentation with and development of standards of behaviour. Widening the participation in a dispute about conduct normally generates heat rather than light. Voting on a matter of appropriate conduct is a reasonable way forward (if overly heavyweight and overly public way) and a popularity contest is a good way to select an arbiter of good manners. For these reasons, the powers and processes adopted by the SC and those adopted by the TC ought to be very different. The SC should be able to intervene in a public conversation even if neither participant is upset - because the SC is supposed to be keeping the venues useable for everyone. The SC should usually be able to act informally, and it should normally do so privately and quietly. Now, onto the question of policy. Josip's draft suggests that the SC should be in charge of writing social policies and seems to me to read as if that is going to be a primary activity of the SC. But that's not what's needed. We don't need a policy, we need enforcement of civilised norms of behaviour. We don't need a definition of arseholeness. What we need is someone who can speak softly and carry a big stick. Finally, Josip's draft relies in the definition of the SC's powers almost entirely on the definition of the word `social'. Unfortunately this word is almost meaningless. The problem of argumenents in the TC about whether something is `technical' or not is already bad enough (although this is partly because we don't have a way not to have the rudeness arguments come to the TC). But at least `technical' actually means something. It will be impossible to agree what `social' means. If my first argument above, about the SC's intended powers, is accepted, then this will become moot. The SC's power is over disputes that can be solved by making access control decisions. Ian. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
