On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 07:01:36AM +0800, James Bromberger wrote: > On 26/07/2017 6:20 AM, Adam Borowski wrote: > > https provides no protection against targetted attacks by government > > agents. > > The CA cartel model consists of 400+ CAs, many of them outright controlled > > by governments, most of the rest doing what they're told (no, warrants are > > are a story for nice kids). Clients in general trust _any_ CA, which means > > you're only as secure as the worst CA. Ie, https protects you against Joe > > Script Kiddie but not against a capable opponent. > > Except there are new-ish ways to limit the scope from 400+ CAs to just > the one you use. > c.f. > /Certification Authority Authorization/ (/CAA/) /DNS/ Resource > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844 > > ... if APT wishes to support this.
This one is meant to be used only by CAs. And a rogue CA has no reason to obey this request (especially if it _normally_ obeys it). For users, the equivalent is TLSA, which allows both CA constraints and specifying a fingerprint of the certificate itself. -- ⢀⣴⠾⠻⢶⣦⠀ What Would Jesus Do, MUD/MMORPG edition: ⣾⠁⢰⠒⠀⣿⡁ • multiplay with an admin char to benefit your mortal ⢿⡄⠘⠷⠚⠋⠀ • abuse item cloning bugs (the five fishes + two breads affair) ⠈⠳⣄⠀⠀⠀⠀ • use glitches to walk on water
