On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> But, let's try a simpler multi-option ballot, with everyone in favor.
> Ballot: ABC, 3:1 supermajority required for A, 10 votes, all cast as:
> ABC.
>
> If there was no supermajority, the ballots would look like:
>
> 10:0 A:B
> 10:0 B:C
> 10:0 A:C
>
> And you can figure out by inspection that A wins.
>
> However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
>
> 10 : 0 B:C
> 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> 3 1/3: 0 A:C
>
> B wins.
>
> There is a similar flaw even without supermajority (by indicating a
> second or even third preference, I can tip the balance in favor of another
> option, causing it to win), but that's a bit more subtle to talk about.
>
> What's interesting is that most of the voting mechanisms you posted
> about share this characteristic about supermajority votes. [Of course,
> the characteristic goes away if you offer a simple 2 choice ballot,
> because in that circumstance they're all equivalent.]
Which sheds a great deal of light on the motivations behind his "amendment"
to John Goerzen's proposal.
--
G. Branden Robinson | <joeyh> oh my, it's a UP P III.
Debian GNU/Linux | <doogie> dos it.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | * joeyh runs dselect
http://www.debian.org/~branden/ | <Overfiend> that ought to be sufficient :)
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