> > With a 3:1 supermajority, the 60 raw votes for A are equivalent to 20 > > real votes, so A does not dominate B.
On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 10:07:24AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: > I'm no longer at all sure what you're talking about then. Note that I'm > not referring to the system described in the constitution here, but to > general Condorcet voting schemes. Ok, but I don't know why you're not sure that I'm talking about the constitution? > Consider another possible vote outcome: > 60 votes A > 21 votes BAF > in which case: ... > and B wins, in spite of everyone being happy with A, and almost everyone > prefering it. Yep -- A didn't win by 3 to 1. 3:1 supermajority requires a near unanomous agreement among those voting. > > Furthermore, you've not specified quorum -- F gets quorum votes, > > automatically. > > I'm not sure where you're getting this from at all. The constitution handles > quorums as follows: > > 8. If a quorum is required, there must be at least that many votes > which prefer the winning option to the default option. If there > are not then the default option wins after all. For votes > requiring a supermajority, the actual number of Yes votes is used > when checking whether the quorum has been reached. > > You don't add pretend votes to the default option. Indeed "adding" votes > isn't entirely meaningful, in Condorcet systems votes indicate a preference > amongst options, they don't get assigned to an option. That's certainly a reasonable way of looking at it. In any event, you didn't specify a quorum in your example, but you were talking about a ballot very like the sort specified by the constitution. If you actually are talking about something relevant to debian (and, I don't feel too bad interpreting what you write in that fashion -- this list is "debian-vote" after all), then the quorum is relevant in deciding the outcome. ... > > > example: > > > 30 ABC > > > 25 BCA > > > 35 CAB ... > Well, under A.6(3) your first action is to discard all options (since > they're all dominated by at least one other) and ignore references > to them in ballots. If you want to proceed down that route, either you eliminate B (since A:B domination "dominates" all the other pairwise matchings) or you postpone handling of this step because it's trivial. If that turns out to be too ambiguous, perhaps we need a constitutional ammendment? > A.6(4) doesn't apply since nothing dominates all others, A.6(5) > doesn't apply since there aren't any options remaining. A.6(6) could > apply, I suppose, in which case any of A, B or C would win depending > on what the DPL decided. Nothing in the constitution says A.6(5) must happen after A.6(3). Or, if you did manage to eliminate all options remember the quorum rule. > And I'm not trying to describe what the constitution says happens > because I think it's broken. I'm trying to understand what *should* > happen. Then why did you say (near the top) that you're not referring to the system described in the constitution? -- Raul
