On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: > Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of > opinion.
Agreed. Still, consensus is possible. > Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be > called "Instant Runoff Voting" or "IRV" on most of the voting method > websites) because it "biases selection in favor of first preferences > at the expense of other preferences". Obviously, you think this is a > good thing. Sure -- but logically, if I'm a voter, and I indicate a second and third preference on a ballot, that shouldn't weaken the strength of my first preference. > Others may prefer other methods because they reverse the preferences of > the fewest number of voters. This is a different criteria. Is it > better? I think so, and so do others. You may not. Most of the > "traditional" Condorcet resolution methods favor this criteria. Sure -- mediocracy tends to be easy to agree on. > I think the best we can do is list a bunch of alternatives, with > explanations and descriptions of their advantages and disadvantages, > and discuss from there. I'm willing (see above :). > > I'll note that the URL you cited doesn't have anything equivalent to > > Single Transferrable Vote. [So it's not comprehensive.] I don't think > > "my favorite web site doesn't mention this system" somehow makes the > > systems it proposes to be somehow superior. > > The URL I'm looking at does not discuss IRV under Condorcet resolution > methods, but it does discuss IRV as a technique for general elections > (i.e., an alternative to Condorcet). I'm looking at http:// > www.electionmethods.org/, which does have some faults (it has an > -extreme- bias towards Condorcet and against plurality and IRV, for > instance). Turns out I'd missed the cite. > > The nice thing about Single Transferrable Vote is that it > > automatically makes first preference votes more important than > > second preference votes (and so on). There are few systems at the > > URL you cited which even attempt this. > > Most of the Condorcet resolution methods I've seen don't attempt that > because they don't see it as a valid criteria. They see overruling the > fewest number of votes to be a valid criteria. Right, but that's method, and not a reason why. > Actually, I did find one description of a voting concern that does > severely impact IRV. IRV requires the multiple examination of every > ballot, which can be prohibitive if the number of ballots is huge, > or fragile, etc. Since most voting reform sites are concerned with > reform of real-world elections, where there may be millions of voters, > this is a bigger concern for them than it is for us. And this is a > valid criteria for them to consider. The Condorcet resolution methods > normally discussed can all be computed solely from the aggregate > voting data, not needing to further examine individual ballots. In other words: it requires computerization of the voting process. And: rankings actually indicate preference, as they represent more than the ability to cast multiple votes. > > > This sort of situation happens no matter how you resolve a cyclic > > > tie, though. You pretty much have to be "unfair" in some sense to > > > choose a winner. As I said, I'm inclined to suspect that there > > > other means are likely to be more optimal, although I'm not clear > > > exactly how. > > > > It really sounds more as if you want to find faults in the > > constitution than you've thought this through and have a better > > alternative to propose. > > No voting system is going to be 100% "fair" to all voters. The > question remains, however: How do we determine "fairness" to evaluate > different methods? That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying to solve? -- Raul
