I would like to know the result of this ballot. ACB ACB CBA CBA CBA
Where A is default and C requires a supermajority (as far as I can tell its A, even though B, not needing a supermajority, beat it pairwise). As far as I can tell, C is the winner of step two, but defeated in step 3 by the default option supermajority veto. So then the default option gets special treatment and is declared the winner, even though B beats A pairwise. Andrew Pilmott has explain it better than me, that any implimentation that treats default options specially (not supermajority or quorum requirements, but default options), is bound to have strategy problems, in this case, introducing option C has caused the C honest C voters to spoil their second B preference, which wouldn't of happened in a straight A v B ballot. When I say that the implimentation shouldnn't treat default options specially, I mean that if A and B both have no supermajority and quorum requirements, A should be treated identically to B, regardless of default option status. Maybe a concept of a "default group", may help, that being the group of options without supermajority and quorum requirements. Just a thought. --- Clinton
