On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 07:56:16AM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote: > Raul Miller: > > [3] (current draft) Only consider supermajority in terms of defeating > > the default option. This gets a bit confusing to think about in the > > context of transitive defeats. > > > See my earlier email -- this method favors the default option > unreasonably.
It is not that simple: Suggestion [5] also gives a lot of weight to the default option, as per the example in my last message. My last message also contains a tweak to [3] that favors the default option less. But you might argue it favors the supermajority option unreasonable (by letting it win even when it doesn't have a supermajority). > > [4] (my old hobby horse) Consider supermajority in every comparison > > involving an option with a supermajority requirement. This gets a bit > > confusing to think about in the context of transitive defeats. > > This method invites insincere voting. If the voter would like to vote ABD, > but thinks that B would be strong enough to block any supermajority by A, > they might vote ADB instead. Not good. Huh? Swapping D and B doesn't directly affect B's strength compared to A. This strategy is no more effective here than in straight Condorcet voting. You might like [4] if you think [3] favors the supermajority option too much. Andrew
