On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 12:32:39AM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote: > Let N(a,b) be the number of votes which prefer options a > over options b. Let Q be some positive number (the quorum). > > step 1: remove each option x, where N(x,default) < Q > (per-option quorum) > > step 2: Use Condorcet voting with Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential > Dropping on the remaining options. ... > Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion (SDSC), > Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion (WDSC): > These do hold. If a majority prefers A over B then it can vote > ADB to ensure that B cannot win. Either B fails at the quota > criterion or the SDSC condition of the Condorcet method ensures > that B looses.
Are you considering the default option to be a candidate? [You don't say one way or the other.] If you do then these criterion do not hold. For example: quorum is 45 and three people vote, all three prefer option A over option D. These three people have no way of voting which prevents the election from defaulting. I've not taken the time to study the rest of your analysis. Thanks, -- Raul
