The Technical Committee (and those interested in the libc's resolver behaviour) are having some trouble because of an off-by-one error in the supermajority specification in recent versions of the constitution.
This was discussed in http://lists.debian.org/debian-ctte/2004/05/msg00027.html and has recently caused trouble for an actual vote. To give a clear and simple hypothetical example: suppose 120 developers vote on constitutional amendment GR, with a simple Y vs. FD ballot (requires 3:1). Suppose the quorum is met and 90 vote in favour and 30 against. Then according to the current wording, Y fails to defeat FD by 3:1 because 90 is exactly 3 times 30, whereas the requirement from A.6 is that it should be strictly greater. This causes the most trouble for small electorates, obviously - of which the TC is the chief example. It seems clear to me that the TC's `3:1 supermajority' requirement as stated in 6.1(4) should be read as intended to allow the TC to override if (say) three TC members vote in favour and one against. Also, read literally, A.6(3) seems to always eliminate the default option since it never strictly defeats itself (!) This isn't a very reasonable interpretation but is another reason why the bug should be fixed. I suggest the following wording: * Replace `strictly greater than' with `at least' in A.6(3)(2). The result reads: 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio N, if V(A,D) is at least N * V(D,A). The immediate effect of this is that options which are tied with the default option are not dropped; options with a supermajority requirement are likewise not dropped if they exactly meet the supermajority requirement. This has two practical consequences: Firstly, the off-by-one error in supermajorities is fixed: if the number of Yes voters is exactly 3x or 2x (as the case may be) the number of FD voters, the resolution is considered successful. (In a vote with no cycles and where a position option meets a supermajority, FD will be eliminated from the Schwartz set by A.6(6).) Secondly, where there is a casting vote, it allows the elector with the casting vote to choose between FD and Yes if they are tied. While we're looking at this text, the use of `defeat' is slightly confusing, and made more so by this change, because the criterion for defeating the default option in the new A.6(3) is different from the definition of defeat provided in A.6(4). So I propose one other change to go along with this: * Change to `defeat [the default option]' throughout A.6(3) to `overcome'. That gives: Any (non-default) option which does not overcome the default option by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration. 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who prefer option A over option B. 2. An option A overcomes the default option D by a majority ratio N, if V(A,D) is at least N * V(D,A). 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1. Additionally, the TC had considered experimenting with the idea of rotating the post of TC Chairman, to try to make things a bit more dynamic. However it's not clear with the current constititution that the TC has the power to (for example) set out a timetable specifying the chairman at various times. So I would like to suggest replacing 6.1(7) with something like: 7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee The Committee may by resolution specify which of its members is its Chairman. If it does not do so, or circumstances arise which are incompatible with the resolution, the Chairmanship is vacant until this situation is remedied. /Rationale: For example, the Committee might establish a schedule for a rotating Chairman, or appoint a Deputy to take over under specified conditions./ Ian. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
