On Fri, May 10, 2013 at 04:40:37PM -0400, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > So my understanding of things is that for your first 2 examples, > > voters for B being dishonest resulted in C winning > > In CSSD, as defined in the Debian Constitution (and as I define it > too), but disregarding the default alternative, D, and disregarding > the local or per-option quota, R, B would win, by defection in all 3 > of my examples (when my first example is corrected to "100: C", > instead of "3: C".
Going over them again, you had: example 1: - A defeats B by 99:2 - C defeats A by 100:99 - B defeats C by 101:100 If I read the constitution correctly, I need to drop the 1st defeat, because V(A,B) = 99, and V(C, A) = 100, and 99 < 100, so that's the weakest defeat, and B is the winner. Example 2: A defeats B by 33:32 C defeats A by 34:33 B defeats C by 65:34 And B would be the winner again. I have to admit that I didn't correctly understand how things work when it's not resolved by the transitive defeats. > When I posted my examples, I didn't know about D or R. > > II understand that, before the CSSD count is done, any option X that > loses to D (more people rank D over X than X over D) is dropped. And, > likewise, any option that isn't ranked over D by some specified > number, R, of people is dropped. > > I want to add that I can't find any rule for choosing the numerical value of > R. The quorum (R) for most votes is "3Q" (4.2.4, 5.2.7) and Q depends on the amount of DDs (4.2.7), and Q is normally somewhere around 15-16, R being around 45-47. > But at the end of your post, you said something to the effect that, > when D is taken into account, where A>B>>C is (correctly, in my > opinion) interpreted as A>B>D>C, then the defection works perfectly, > and elects B every time, just as I said it would in my examples. Yes, you have the same effect generated by the default option (D) than we already had without it. > We don't reallly disagree, then. We agree that, with the present > system, the B voters' defection, in those examples, will elect B, > stealing the election from A. > > Then that's why I propose that Schwartz Woodall would be a better > voting system for Debian, because Schwarz Woodall doesn't have a > chicken dilemma. That means that the Mutual Majority Criterion is > fully in force. It means that a mutual majority truly have no need to > do other than rank sincerely, to ensure that one of their > mutual-majority-preferred options will win. ...and they can achieve > that even while freely choosing among their MM-preferred options, by > ranking them sincerely. > > In CSSD, the chicken dilemma can spoil and disband a mutual majority. > > I recommend Schwartz Woodall for Debian voting. I will try to read about this, I didn't have time for it so far. I do understand that we have this chicken dilemma problem, but I'm not convinced it's really a problem in Debian. Kurt -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-vote-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: http://lists.debian.org/20130510225025.ga16...@roeckx.be