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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2196?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel#action_12471174
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Daniel John Debrunner commented on DERBY-2196:
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> I think that that hole exists regardless of whether the black-hat jar file is
> ${derby.install.url} or ${derby.install.url}/lib/derby.jar.
I think that a codebase in a policy file of ${derby.install.url} is a *much*
bigger hole than ${derby.install.url}/lib/derby.jar
and has the potential to be beneifical to hostile clients.
The reasons is that if I can modify ${derby.install.url} than I can point to
any code including the special token of *all* code.
If I have the ability to set a system property on a remote host but don't have
the ability to install software there, then I can could potentially use a
remote server to grant a wide range of permissions to all code including SQL
Java routines, thus allowing remote SQL Java routine defined by me remotely to
have a wide range of permissions.
Limiting the hole to jar files called derby.jar in a lib folder is a much
smaller exposure and cannot be exploited by SQL Java routines.
Maybe a remote client having the ability to set a system property is somewhat
unlikely, but to be clear it need not be the permission to set all system
properties, just one specific one, or the ability to set one in the derby.*
namespace. Thus someone else may set up a policy file that allows some code to
set derby.* properties as system properties and not realize they could have
opened up everything.
We don't have to expose these properties in the template policy, it could have
its codebase manipulated in the build process to be something like (actual
text): replace_with_path_to_derby_install/lib/derby.jar
Ie. something that forces the application developer to edit it.
It is a template for a policy file, that we expect the user to modify anyway.
> Run standalone network server with security manager by default
> --------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2196
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2196
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Components: Network Server, Security
> Reporter: Daniel John Debrunner
> Assigned To: Rick Hillegas
> Attachments: derby-2196-01-print-01.diff,
> derby-2196-01-print-02.diff, derby-2196-01-print-03.diff, secureServer.html,
> secureServer.html, secureServer.html, secureServer.html, secureServer.html,
> secureServer.html
>
>
> From an e-mail discussion:
> ... Derby should match the security provided by typical client server
> systems such as DB2, Oracle, etc. I
> think in this case system/database owners are trusting the database
> system to ensure that their system cannot be attacked. So maybe if Derby
> is booted as a standalone server with no security manager involved, it
> should install one with a default security policy. Thus allowing Derby
> to use Java security manager to manage system privileges but not
> requiring everyone to become familiar with them.
> http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/db-derby-dev/200612.mbox/[EMAIL
> PROTECTED]
> I imagine such a policy would allow any access to databases under
> derby.system.home and/or user.home.
> By standalone I mean the network server was started though the main() method
> (command line).
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