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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12561409#action_12561409
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djd edited comment on DERBY-2109 at 1/22/08 11:07 AM:
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> Maybe we could add a userNamesAreCaseSensitive() method to UserAuthenticator
> or create a CaseSensitiveUserAuthenticator interface to extend
> UserAuthenticator? Given a case-sensitive UserAuthenticator, we would not
> have to throw Edward and EdWard into the same schema. The default behavior
> would be the current behavior. And the default behavior for SystemPrincipal
> would be, as Dan suggests, that usernames are case-insensitive.
----------------------------------------------------------------
DERBY-3335 proposes a mechanism for an authentication implementation to get the
canonical user identifier of the provided user name without changing any api.
That's not exactly what you are proposing, I think you are proposing a new way
of providing a user name to Derby in Java/JDBC where the user name provided has
to match the canonical representation of a user identifier. Obviously in SQL
(e.g. GRANT) such user names would have to be delimited.
Obviously such a change applies to more than authentication, connection level
authorization would need to follow the same scheme, the mapping of the provided
user name to the SQL user identifier etc.
I have the feeling that this might confuse the user name situation more that
simplify it. Now a client application needs to know how a specific database is
treating user names before it can format a connection request. Currently there
is a single rule of how user names in Java map to SQL user identifiers.
If such a feature can be delayed until there is some actual need for it, then I
think it just resolves to a simple choice:
A) name for SystemPrincipal is a user identifier (supports regular and
delimited identifiers) and thus matches all other places where a user name is
specified in a Java/JDBC context.
B) name for SystemPrincipal is the canonical representation of an user
identifier, which leads to easier to read policy files but does not match
existing Java/JDBC practice.
[edit: be consistent with user identifier]
was (Author: djd):
> Maybe we could add a userNamesAreCaseSensitive() method to
UserAuthenticator or create a CaseSensitiveUserAuthenticator interface to
extend UserAuthenticator? Given a case-sensitive UserAuthenticator, we would
not have to throw Edward and EdWard into the same schema. The default behavior
would be the current behavior. And the default behavior for SystemPrincipal
would be, as Dan suggests, that usernames are case-insensitive.
----------------------------------------------------------------
DERBY-3335 proposes a mechanism for an authentication implementation to get the
canonical version of the provided user name without changing any api. That's
not exactly what you are proposing, I think you are proposing a new way of
providing a user name to Derby in Java/JDBC where the user name provided has to
match the canonical representation of an authorization identifier. Obviously in
SQL (e.g. GRANT) such user names would have to be delimited.
Obviously such a change applies to more than authentication, connection level
authorization would need to follow the same scheme, the mapping of the provided
user name to the SQL user identifier etc.
I have the feeling that this might confuse the user name situation more that
simplify it. Now a client application needs to know how a specific database is
treating user names before it can format a connection request. Currently there
is a single rule of how user names in Java map to SQL user identifiers.
If such a feature can be delayed until there is some actual need for it, then I
think it just resolves to a simple choice:
A) name for SystemPrincipal is an authentication identifier (supports regular
and delimited identifiers) and thus matches all other places where a user name
is specified in a Java/JDBC context.
B) name for SystemPrincipal is the canonical representation of an
authentication identifier, which leads to easier to read policy files but does
not match existing Java/JDBC practice.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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