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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-866?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13197081#comment-13197081
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Rick Hillegas edited comment on DERBY-866 at 1/31/12 6:32 PM:
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I have returned to the topic of implementing network password substitution for 
NATIVE authentication. I do not believe this is possible.

NATIVE authentication only works if passwords are hashed by a strong algorithm 
specified by the derby.authentication.builtin.algorithm property. But password 
substitution is not possible with these strong algorithms, according to the 
"Network client security" section of the Admin Guide, and according to the 
10.6.1.0 release note accompanying the work on DERBY-4483 (see 
http://db.apache.org/derby/releases/release-10.6.1.0.html#Note+for+DERBY-4483 ).

This makes sense. For password substitution to work with strong algorithms, the 
network handshake would have to give the client the details about how the 
password is hashed on disk at the server end--those details would have to be 
transmitted BEFORE the substitute password is computed by the client. I am not 
aware of any such negotiation in the Derby network protocol.

NATIVE passwords transmitted over the wire must be secured the same way that 
BUILTIN passwords are secured after the fix to CVE-2009-4269:

1) Both ends of the connection must use a capable JCE which handles the 256 bit 
primes needed by ClientDataSource.ENCRYPTED_USER_AND_PASSWORD_SECURITY.

2) Or the entire network traffic must be encrypted with SSL/TLS.

                
      was (Author: rhillegas):
    I have returned to the topic of implementing network password substitution 
for NATIVE authentication. I do not believe this is possible.

NATIVE authentication only works if passwords are hashed by a strong algorithm 
specified by the derby.authentication.builtin.algorithm property. But password 
substitution is not possible with these strong algorithms, according to the 
"Network client security" section of the Admin Guide, and according to the 
10.6.2.0 release note accompanying the work on DERBY-4483 (see 
http://db.apache.org/derby/releases/release-10.6.1.0.html#Note+for+DERBY-4483 ).

This makes sense. For password substitution to work with strong algorithms, the 
network handshake would have to give the client the details about how the 
password is hashed on disk at the server end--those details would have to be 
transmitted BEFORE the substitute password is computed by the client. I am not 
aware of any such negotiation in the Derby network protocol.

NATIVE passwords transmitted over the wire must be secured the same way that 
BUILTIN passwords are secured after the fix to CVE-2009-4269:

1) Both ends of the connection must use a capable JCE which handles the 256 bit 
primes needed by ClientDataSource.ENCRYPTED_USER_AND_PASSWORD_SECURITY.

2) Or the entire network traffic must be encrypted with SSL/TLS.

                  
> Derby User Management Enhancements
> ----------------------------------
>
>                 Key: DERBY-866
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-866
>             Project: Derby
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: Services
>    Affects Versions: 10.2.1.6
>            Reporter: Francois Orsini
>            Assignee: Rick Hillegas
>         Attachments: Derby_User_Enhancement.html, 
> Derby_User_Enhancement_v1.1.html, DummyAuthenticator.java, 
> UserManagement.html, UserManagement.html, UserManagement.html, 
> UserManagement.html, UserManagement.html, derby-866-01-aa-sysusers.diff, 
> derby-866-01-ab-sysusers.diff, derby-866-02-ag-createDropUser.diff, 
> derby-866-03-aa-resetModifyPassword.diff, 
> derby-866-03-ab-resetModifyPassword.diff, derby-866-04-aa-fixRolesTest.diff, 
> derby-866-05-aa-grantRevoke.diff, derby-866-06-aa-upgradeFrom10.1.diff, 
> derby-866-07-aa-removeSQLPassword.diff, derby-866-08-aa-passwordHasher.diff, 
> derby-866-08-ab-passwordHasher.diff, derby-866-08-ad-passwordHasher.diff, 
> derby-866-09-ad-nativeAuthenticationService.diff, 
> derby-866-09-ae-nativeAuthenticationServiceWithTests.diff, 
> derby-866-10-ac-propChanging.diff, derby-866-11-aa-upgradeTest.diff, 
> derby-866-12-ac-passwordExpiration.diff, dummyCredentials.properties
>
>
> Proposal to enhance Derby's Built-In DDL User Management. (See proposal spec 
> attached to the JIRA).
> Abstract:
> This feature aims at improving the way BUILT-IN users are managed in Derby by 
> providing a more intuitive and familiar DDL interface. Currently (in 
> 10.1.2.1), Built-In users can be defined at the system and/or database level. 
> Users created at the system level can be defined via JVM or/and Derby system 
> properties in the derby.properties file. Built-in users created at the 
> database level are defined via a call to a Derby system procedure 
> (SYSCS_UTIL.SYSCS_SET_DATABASE_PROPERTY) which sets a database property.
> Defining a user at the system level is very convenient and practical during 
> the development phase (EOD) of an application - However, the user's password 
> is not encrypted and consequently appears in clear in the derby.properties 
> file. Hence, for an application going into production, whether it is embedded 
> or not, it is preferable to create users at the database level where the 
> password is encrypted.
> There is no real ANSI SQL standard for managing users in SQL but by providing 
> a more intuitive and known interface, it will ease Built-In User management 
> at the database level as well as Derby's adoption.

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