The branch stable/14 has been updated by markj: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=6269b9bce0e344336e9cc4f35ebf3fa66d74ca10
commit 6269b9bce0e344336e9cc4f35ebf3fa66d74ca10 Author: Mark Johnston <[email protected]> AuthorDate: 2026-08-24 18:14:18 +0000 Commit: Mark Johnston <[email protected]> CommitDate: 2026-08-25 15:58:57 +0000 tty: Revalidate after dropping the tty lock in ioctl handlers The TIOCSCTTY ioctl handler drops the tty lock in order to acquire the proctree relock. After relocking the tty, it did not revalidate the tty state, and it could end up linking a doomed tty to the calling process' session. This race can be exploited to escalate privileges. TIOCSPGRP has a similar race, fix that too. Approved by: so Security: FreeBSD-SA-26:62.tty Security: CVE-2026-58093 Reported by: tsune of GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc. working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative Reviewed by: kib Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D59126 --- sys/kern/tty.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sys/kern/tty.c b/sys/kern/tty.c index 3bacbde3d1b0..9578dc876ea6 100644 --- a/sys/kern/tty.c +++ b/sys/kern/tty.c @@ -1877,7 +1877,12 @@ tty_generic_ioctl(struct tty *tp, u_long cmd, void *data, int fflag, /* XXX: This looks awful. */ tty_unlock(tp); sx_xlock(&proctree_lock); - tty_lock(tp); + error = ttydev_enter(tp); + if (error != 0) { + sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock); + tty_lock(tp); + return (error); + } if (!SESS_LEADER(p)) { /* Only the session leader may do this. */ @@ -1941,7 +1946,12 @@ tty_generic_ioctl(struct tty *tp, u_long cmd, void *data, int fflag, tty_lock(tp); return (EPERM); } - tty_lock(tp); + error = ttydev_enter(tp); + if (error != 0) { + sx_sunlock(&proctree_lock); + tty_lock(tp); + return (error); + } /* * Determine if this TTY is the controlling TTY after
