The branch stable/15 has been updated by ssaxena:

URL: 
https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=93970927e284a3541b4e3252d21f23eea6cdfc88

commit 93970927e284a3541b4e3252d21f23eea6cdfc88
Author:     Chandrakanth Patil <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: 2026-03-31 16:59:01 +0000
Commit:     Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
CommitDate: 2026-09-30 10:39:30 +0000

    bnxt_en: Add per-VF trust, spoof-check and promiscuous controls
    
    Expose per-VF policy knobs via the FreeBSD sysctl tree and enforce
    them at the data-path level.
    
    Trust (dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN.trusted):
      bnxt_set_vf_trust() sets/clears BNXT_VF_TRUST and sends
      HWRM_FUNC_CFG with FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_ENABLE/DISABLE.
      bnxt_create_trusted_vf_sysctls() / bnxt_destroy_trusted_vf_sysctls()
      manage the sysctl lifetime with VF creation/teardown.
    
    Spoof-check (dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN.spoofchk):
      bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk() issues HWRM_FUNC_CFG with
      SRC_MAC_ADDR_CHECK_ENABLE/DISABLE.
    
    Promiscuous gating:
      bnxt_is_trusted_vf() queries firmware via HWRM_FUNC_QCFG.
      bnxt_promisc_ok() returns false for untrusted VFs, preventing them
      from entering promiscuous mode.  bnxt_promisc_set() is updated to
      gate the PROMISCUOUS and ANYVLAN_NONVLAN mask bits on bnxt_promisc_ok().
    
    bnxt_iov_vf_add() applies the initial trust/spoof-check policy from the
    nvlist schema.  bnxt_iov_init() creates the sysctl trees after
    bnxt_cfg_hw_sriov() succeeds.  bnxt_iov_uninit() tears them down.
    
    MFC after:      1 month
    Reviewed by:    ssaxena
    Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56200
    
    (cherry picked from commit ea4ab7e36ed9cf153c374782be446254a7d11822)
---
 sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c | 267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c    |   6 +-
 2 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c 
b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c
index 9bec955f9890..2d9b43728c2d 100644
--- a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c
+++ b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 #include "bnxt_hwrm.h"
 #include "bnxt_sriov.h"
 
-
 static int
 bnxt_set_vf_admin_mac(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf,
                      const uint8_t *mac)
@@ -89,6 +88,9 @@ bnxt_iov_vf_add(if_ctx_t ctx, uint16_t vfnum, const nvlist_t 
*params)
                                      vfnum, rc);
        }
 
+       (void)bnxt_set_vf_trust(softc, vfnum, vf->trusted);
+       (void)bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(softc, vfnum, vf->spoofchk);
+
        return 0;
 }
 
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ void bnxt_iov_uninit(if_ctx_t ctx)
        if (rc)
                device_printf(softc->dev, "VF resource free HWRM failed: %d\n", 
rc);
 
+       bnxt_destroy_trusted_vf_sysctls(softc);
        bnxt_free_vf_resources(softc);
        BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK_DESTROY(softc);
 }
@@ -349,6 +352,75 @@ bnxt_is_trusted_vf(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct 
bnxt_vf_info *vf)
        return !!(vf->func_qcfg_flags & HWRM_FUNC_QCFG_OUTPUT_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF);
 }
 
+bool bnxt_promisc_ok(struct bnxt_softc *softc)
+{
+       if (BNXT_VF(softc) && !bnxt_is_trusted_vf(softc, &softc->vf))
+               return false;
+       return true;
+}
+
+static int
+bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
+{
+       struct hwrm_func_cfg_input req = {0};
+       int rc;
+
+       if (!(softc->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
+               return (EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+       bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(softc, &req, HWRM_FUNC_CFG);
+
+       req.fid = htole16(vf->fw_fid);
+
+       if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST)
+               req.flags = 
cpu_to_le32(HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_ENABLE);
+       else
+               req.flags = 
cpu_to_le32(HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_DISABLE);
+
+       BNXT_HWRM_LOCK(softc);
+       rc = _hwrm_send_message(softc, &req, sizeof(req));
+       BNXT_HWRM_UNLOCK(softc);
+       if (rc)
+               device_printf(softc->dev, "bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf failed. 
rc:%d\n", rc);
+
+       return rc;
+}
+
+int
+bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct bnxt_softc *softc, int vf_id, bool trusted)
+{
+       int rc;
+       struct bnxt_vf_info *vf = NULL;
+
+       BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
+       if (softc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id >= softc->pf.num_vfs) {
+               BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+               return (ENOENT);
+       }
+       vf = &softc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+
+       if (trusted)
+               vf->flags |= BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+       else
+               vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+
+       BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+
+       rc = bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(softc, vf);
+       if (rc == 0) {
+               BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
+               if (softc->pf.num_vfs != 0 && vf_id < softc->pf.num_vfs) {
+                       vf = &softc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+                       if (trusted)
+                               vf->flags |= BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+                       else
+                               vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+               }
+               BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+       }
+       return rc;
+}
+
 static int
 bnxt_vf_configure_mac(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
 {
@@ -452,6 +524,186 @@ void bnxt_hwrm_exec_fwd_req(struct bnxt_softc *softc)
        }
 }
 
+/* destroy VF sysctls when VFs are removed / PF detaches. */
+void
+bnxt_destroy_trusted_vf_sysctls(struct bnxt_softc *softc)
+{
+       sysctl_ctx_free(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx);
+}
+
+/* Handler for: dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf<N>.trusted  (0/1) */
+static int
+bnxt_sysctl_vf_trusted(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
+{
+       struct bnxt_softc *softc = (struct bnxt_softc *)arg1;
+       int vf_id = (int)arg2;
+       int val, rc;
+
+       BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
+       if (softc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id < 0 || vf_id >= softc->pf.num_vfs) {
+               BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+               return (ENOENT);
+       }
+       val = (softc->pf.vf[vf_id].flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) ? 1 : 0;
+       BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+
+       rc = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
+       /* If no new value supplied, it was a READ */
+       if (req->newptr == NULL)
+               return 0;
+
+       /* WRITE path: 'val' now holds the user's 0/1 */
+       rc = bnxt_set_vf_trust(softc, vf_id, (val != 0));
+
+       return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create per-VF sysctls:
+ *   dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf0.trusted
+ *   dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf1.trusted
+ *   ..
+ */
+int
+bnxt_create_trusted_vf_sysctls(struct bnxt_softc *softc, uint16_t num_vfs)
+{
+       struct sysctl_oid_list *root_list;
+       struct sysctl_oid *vf_node;
+       char node_name[16];
+
+       /* use the device's sysctl tree as root: dev.bnxt.<unit>. */
+       sysctl_ctx_init(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx);
+       root_list = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(device_get_sysctl_tree(softc->dev));
+
+       for (int i = 0; i < num_vfs; i++) {
+               snprintf(node_name, sizeof(node_name), "vf%d", i);
+
+               /* dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN */
+               vf_node = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+                                         root_list, OID_AUTO,
+                                         node_name, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "VF node");
+
+               /* dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN.trusted */
+               SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+                               SYSCTL_CHILDREN(vf_node),
+                               OID_AUTO, "trusted",
+                               CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
+                               softc, i, bnxt_sysctl_vf_trusted, "I",
+                               "0=untrusted (default), 1=trusted");
+       }
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bnxt_hwrm_set_vf_spoofchk(struct bnxt_softc *sc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf,
+                         bool enable)
+{
+       struct hwrm_func_cfg_input req = {0};
+       int rc = 0;
+
+       bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(sc, &req, HWRM_FUNC_CFG);
+
+       req.fid = htole16(vf->fw_fid);
+       req.flags = htole32(enable ?
+                   HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_SRC_MAC_ADDR_CHECK_ENABLE :
+                   HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_SRC_MAC_ADDR_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+       BNXT_HWRM_LOCK(sc);
+       rc = _hwrm_send_message(sc, &req, sizeof(req));
+       BNXT_HWRM_UNLOCK(sc);
+       if (rc)
+               device_printf(sc->dev, "bnxt_hwrm_set_vf_spoofchk failed. 
rc:%d\n", rc);
+
+       return rc;
+}
+
+int
+bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(struct bnxt_softc *sc, int vf_id, bool enable)
+{
+       struct bnxt_vf_info *vf;
+       int rc;
+
+       BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(sc);
+       if (sc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id >= sc->pf.num_vfs) {
+               BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+               return (ENOENT);
+       }
+       vf = &sc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+       BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+
+       rc = bnxt_hwrm_set_vf_spoofchk(sc, vf, enable);
+       if (rc == 0) {
+               BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(sc);
+               if (sc->pf.num_vfs != 0 && vf_id < sc->pf.num_vfs) {
+                       vf = &sc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+                       if (enable)
+                               vf->flags |= BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK;
+                       else
+                               vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK;
+               }
+               BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+       }
+       return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+bnxt_sysctl_vf_spoofchk(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
+{
+       struct bnxt_softc *sc = (struct bnxt_softc *)arg1;
+       int vf_id = (int)arg2;
+       int val, rc;
+
+       BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(sc);
+       if (sc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id >= sc->pf.num_vfs) {
+               BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+               return (ENOENT);
+       }
+       val = (sc->pf.vf[vf_id].flags & BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK) ? 1 : 0;
+       BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+
+       rc = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req);
+       if (rc || req->newptr == NULL)
+               return rc;
+
+       return bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(sc, vf_id, val != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create per-VF spoofchk:
+ *   dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf0.spoofchk
+ *   dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf1.spoofchk
+ *   ..
+ */
+int
+bnxt_create_spoofchk_vf_sysctls(struct bnxt_softc *softc, uint16_t num_vfs)
+{
+       struct sysctl_oid_list *root_list;
+       struct sysctl_oid *vf_node;
+       char node_name[16];
+
+       /* Reuse the same ctx & root tree as trusted vf */
+       root_list = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(device_get_sysctl_tree(softc->dev));
+
+       for (int i = 0; i < num_vfs; i++) {
+               snprintf(node_name, sizeof(node_name), "vf%d", i);
+
+               vf_node = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+                                         root_list, OID_AUTO,
+                                         node_name, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "VF node");
+
+               SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+                               SYSCTL_CHILDREN(vf_node),
+                               OID_AUTO, "spoofchk",
+                               CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
+                               softc, i, bnxt_sysctl_vf_spoofchk, "I",
+                               "0=spoofchk off, 1=spoofchk on");
+       }
+       return 0;
+}
+
 static int
 bnxt_hwrm_func_vf_resc_cfg(struct bnxt_softc *softc, int num_vfs, bool reset)
 {
@@ -673,6 +925,17 @@ bnxt_iov_init(if_ctx_t ctx, uint16_t num_vfs, const 
nvlist_t *params)
        if (rc)
                goto fail_free_vf_resc;
 
+       rc = bnxt_create_trusted_vf_sysctls(softc, num_vfs);
+       if (rc) {
+               device_printf(softc->dev, "trusted VF sysctl creation failed 
(error=%d)\n", rc);
+               goto fail_free_hwrm_vf_resc;
+       }
+
+       rc = bnxt_create_spoofchk_vf_sysctls(softc, num_vfs);
+       if (rc) {
+               device_printf(softc->dev, "spoof check VF sysctl creation 
failed (error=%d)\n", rc);
+               goto fail_free_hwrm_vf_resc;
+       }
 
        BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
        softc->pf.num_vfs = num_vfs;
@@ -680,6 +943,8 @@ bnxt_iov_init(if_ctx_t ctx, uint16_t num_vfs, const 
nvlist_t *params)
 
        return 0;
 
+fail_free_hwrm_vf_resc:
+       bnxt_hwrm_func_vf_resource_free(softc, num_vfs);
 fail_free_vf_resc:
        bnxt_free_vf_resources(softc);
 fail_lock:
diff --git a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c
index 6529a03e3323..7897e39ffe24 100644
--- a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c
+++ b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c
@@ -3783,13 +3783,15 @@ bnxt_promisc_set(if_ctx_t ctx, int flags)
                softc->vnic_info.rx_mask &=
                    ~HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_ALL_MCAST;
 
-       if (if_getflags(ifp) & IFF_PROMISC)
+       if ((if_getflags(ifp) & IFF_PROMISC) &&
+            bnxt_promisc_ok(softc))
                softc->vnic_info.rx_mask |=
                    HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_PROMISCUOUS |
                    HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_ANYVLAN_NONVLAN;
        else
                softc->vnic_info.rx_mask &=
-                   ~(HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_PROMISCUOUS);
+                   ~(HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_PROMISCUOUS |
+                   HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_ANYVLAN_NONVLAN);
 
        rc = bnxt_hwrm_cfa_l2_set_rx_mask(softc, &softc->vnic_info);
 

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