The branch main has been updated by jhb:
URL:
https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=4361c4eb6e3620e68d005c1671fdbf60b1fe83c6
commit 4361c4eb6e3620e68d005c1671fdbf60b1fe83c6
Author: John Baldwin <j...@freebsd.org>
AuthorDate: 2021-10-06 21:08:48 +0000
Commit: John Baldwin <j...@freebsd.org>
CommitDate: 2021-10-06 21:08:48 +0000
cryptosoft: Fix support for variable tag lengths in AES-CCM.
The tag length is included as one of the values in the flags byte of
block 0 passed to CBC_MAC, so merely copying the first N bytes is
insufficient.
To avoid adding more sideband data to the CBC MAC software context,
pull the generation of block 0, the AAD length, and AAD padding out of
cbc_mac.c and into cryptosoft.c. This matches how GCM/GMAC are
handled where the length block is constructed in cryptosoft.c and
passed as an input to the Update callback. As a result, the CBC MAC
Update() routine is now much simpler and simply performs the
XOR-and-encrypt step on each input block.
While here, avoid a copy to the staging block in the Update routine
when one or more full blocks are passed as input to the Update
callback.
Reviewed by: sef
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D32120
---
sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++------
sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c | 157 ++++++---------------------------------
sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h | 6 +-
sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
4 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c b/sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c
index b7fa048543b7..fae77423aaa5 100644
--- a/sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c
+++ b/sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c
@@ -1893,8 +1893,60 @@ ccr_ccm_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s,
/*
* Handle a CCM request that is not supported by the crypto engine by
- * performing the operation in software. Derived from swcr_authenc().
+ * performing the operation in software. Derived from swcr_ccm().
*/
+static void
+build_ccm_b0(const char *nonce, u_int nonce_length, u_int aad_length,
+ u_int data_length, u_int tag_length, uint8_t *b0)
+{
+ uint8_t *bp;
+ uint8_t flags, L;
+
+ KASSERT(nonce_length >= 7 && nonce_length <= 13,
+ ("nonce_length must be between 7 and 13 bytes"));
+
+ /*
+ * Need to determine the L field value. This is the number of
+ * bytes needed to specify the length of the message; the length
+ * is whatever is left in the 16 bytes after specifying flags and
+ * the nonce.
+ */
+ L = 15 - nonce_length;
+
+ flags = ((aad_length > 0) << 6) +
+ (((tag_length - 2) / 2) << 3) +
+ L - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we need to set up the first block, which has flags, nonce,
+ * and the message length.
+ */
+ b0[0] = flags;
+ memcpy(b0 + 1, nonce, nonce_length);
+ bp = b0 + 1 + nonce_length;
+
+ /* Need to copy L' [aka L-1] bytes of data_length */
+ for (uint8_t *dst = b0 + CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - 1; dst >= bp; dst--) {
+ *dst = data_length;
+ data_length >>= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* NB: OCF only supports AAD lengths < 2^32. */
+static int
+build_ccm_aad_length(u_int aad_length, uint8_t *blk)
+{
+ if (aad_length < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) {
+ be16enc(blk, aad_length);
+ return (sizeof(uint16_t));
+ } else {
+ blk[0] = 0xff;
+ blk[1] = 0xfe;
+ be32enc(blk + 2, aad_length);
+ return (2 + sizeof(uint32_t));
+ }
+}
+
static void
ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
{
@@ -1904,11 +1956,13 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
union authctx *auth_ctx;
void *kschedule;
char block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
- char digest[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
+ char tag[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
+ u_int taglen;
int error, i, len;
auth_ctx = NULL;
kschedule = NULL;
+ taglen = s->ccm_mac.hash_len;
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
if (crp->crp_payload_length > ccm_max_payload_length(csp)) {
@@ -1956,19 +2010,32 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
goto out;
}
- auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;
- auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, crp->crp_iv, csp->csp_ivlen);
+ /* Supply MAC with b0. */
+ build_ccm_b0(crp->crp_iv, csp->csp_ivlen, crp->crp_aad_length,
+ crp->crp_payload_length, taglen, block);
+ axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN);
+
/* MAC the AAD. */
- if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
- error = axf->Update(auth_ctx, crp->crp_aad,
- crp->crp_aad_length);
- else
- error = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start,
- crp->crp_aad_length, axf->Update, auth_ctx);
- if (error)
- goto out;
+ if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) {
+ len = build_ccm_aad_length(crp->crp_aad_length, block);
+ axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len);
+ if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
+ axf->Update(auth_ctx, crp->crp_aad,
+ crp->crp_aad_length);
+ else
+ crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start,
+ crp->crp_aad_length, axf->Update, auth_ctx);
+
+ /* Pad the AAD (including length field) to a full block. */
+ len = (len + crp->crp_aad_length) % CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN;
+ if (len != 0) {
+ len = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - len;
+ memset(block, 0, CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN);
+ axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len);
+ }
+ }
exf->reinit(kschedule, crp->crp_iv, csp->csp_ivlen);
@@ -1989,19 +2056,17 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
}
/* Finalize MAC. */
- axf->Final(digest, auth_ctx);
+ axf->Final(tag, auth_ctx);
/* Inject or validate tag. */
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
- crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest),
- digest);
+ crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, taglen, tag);
error = 0;
} else {
- char digest2[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
+ char tag2[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
- crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest2),
- digest2);
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(digest, digest2, sizeof(digest)) == 0) {
+ crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, taglen, tag2);
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(tag, tag2, taglen) == 0) {
error = 0;
/* Tag matches, decrypt data. */
@@ -2019,14 +2084,14 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
}
} else
error = EBADMSG;
- explicit_bzero(digest2, sizeof(digest2));
+ explicit_bzero(tag2, sizeof(tag2));
}
out:
zfree(kschedule, M_CCR);
zfree(auth_ctx, M_CCR);
explicit_bzero(block, sizeof(block));
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ explicit_bzero(tag, sizeof(tag));
crp->crp_etype = error;
crypto_done(crp);
}
diff --git a/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c b/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c
index 40afae5373bf..9a030cd54173 100644
--- a/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c
+++ b/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c
@@ -75,85 +75,23 @@ AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey(void *vctx, const uint8_t *key, u_int
klen)
/*
* This is called to set the nonce, aka IV.
- * Before this call, the authDataLength and cryptDataLength fields
- * MUST have been set. Sadly, there's no way to return an error.
*
- * The CBC-MAC algorithm requires that the first block contain the
- * nonce, as well as information about the sizes and lengths involved.
+ * Note that the caller is responsible for constructing b0 as well
+ * as the length and padding around the AAD and passing that data
+ * to _Update.
*/
void
AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit(void *vctx, const uint8_t *nonce, u_int nonceLen)
{
struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx = vctx;
- uint8_t b0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
- uint8_t *bp = b0, flags = 0;
- uint8_t L = 0;
- uint64_t dataLength = ctx->cryptDataLength;
-
- KASSERT(nonceLen >= 7 && nonceLen <= 13,
- ("nonceLen must be between 7 and 13 bytes"));
ctx->nonce = nonce;
ctx->nonceLength = nonceLen;
-
- ctx->authDataCount = 0;
+
ctx->blockIndex = 0;
- explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
-
- /*
- * Need to determine the L field value. This is the number of
- * bytes needed to specify the length of the message; the length
- * is whatever is left in the 16 bytes after specifying flags and
- * the nonce.
- */
- L = 15 - nonceLen;
-
- flags = ((ctx->authDataLength > 0) << 6) +
- (((AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN - 2) / 2) << 3) +
- L - 1;
- /*
- * Now we need to set up the first block, which has flags, nonce,
- * and the message length.
- */
- b0[0] = flags;
- bcopy(nonce, b0 + 1, nonceLen);
- bp = b0 + 1 + nonceLen;
- /* Need to copy L' [aka L-1] bytes of cryptDataLength */
- for (uint8_t *dst = b0 + sizeof(b0) - 1; dst >= bp; dst--) {
- *dst = dataLength;
- dataLength >>= 8;
- }
- /* Now need to encrypt b0 */
- rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, b0, ctx->block);
- /* If there is auth data, we need to set up the staging block */
- if (ctx->authDataLength) {
- size_t addLength;
- if (ctx->authDataLength < ((1<<16) - (1<<8))) {
- uint16_t sizeVal = htobe16(ctx->authDataLength);
- bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block, sizeof(sizeVal));
- addLength = sizeof(sizeVal);
- } else if (ctx->authDataLength < (1ULL<<32)) {
- uint32_t sizeVal = htobe32(ctx->authDataLength);
- ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff;
- ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xfe;
- bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal));
- addLength = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal);
- } else {
- uint64_t sizeVal = htobe64(ctx->authDataLength);
- ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff;
- ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xff;
- bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal));
- addLength = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal);
- }
- ctx->blockIndex = addLength;
- /*
- * The length descriptor goes into the AAD buffer, so we
- * need to account for it.
- */
- ctx->authDataLength += addLength;
- ctx->authDataCount = addLength;
- }
+ /* XOR b0 with all 0's on first call to _Update. */
+ memset(ctx->block, 0, CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN);
}
int
@@ -167,85 +105,35 @@ AES_CBC_MAC_Update(void *vctx, const void *vdata, u_int
length)
data = vdata;
/*
- * This will be called in one of two phases:
- * (1) Applying authentication data, or
- * (2) Applying the payload data.
- *
- * Because CBC-MAC puts the authentication data size before the
- * data, subsequent calls won't be block-size-aligned. Which
- * complicates things a fair bit.
- *
- * The payload data doesn't have that problem.
+ * _Update can be called with non-aligned update lengths. Use
+ * the staging block when necessary.
*/
-
- if (ctx->authDataCount < ctx->authDataLength) {
- /*
- * We need to process data as authentication data.
- * Since we may be out of sync, we may also need
- * to pad out the staging block.
- */
- const uint8_t *ptr = data;
- while (length > 0) {
-
- copy_amt = MIN(length,
- sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex);
-
- bcopy(ptr, ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex,
- copy_amt);
- ptr += copy_amt;
- length -= copy_amt;
- ctx->authDataCount += copy_amt;
- ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt;
- ctx->blockIndex %= sizeof(ctx->staging_block);
+ while (length != 0) {
+ uint8_t *ptr;
- if (ctx->blockIndex == 0 ||
- ctx->authDataCount == ctx->authDataLength) {
- /*
- * We're done with this block, so we
- * xor staging_block with block, and then
- * encrypt it.
- */
- xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block,
ctx->block);
- bzero(ctx->staging_block,
sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
- ctx->blockIndex = 0;
- if (ctx->authDataCount >= ctx->authDataLength)
- break;
- }
- }
/*
- * We'd like to be able to check length == 0 and return
- * here, but the way OCF calls us, length is always
- * blksize (16, in this case). So we have to count on
- * the fact that OCF calls us separately for the AAD and
- * for the real data.
+ * If there is no partial block and the length is at
+ * least a full block, encrypt the full block without
+ * copying to the staging block.
*/
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * If we're here, then we're encoding payload data.
- * This is marginally easier, except that _Update can
- * be called with non-aligned update lengths. As a result,
- * we still need to use the staging block.
- */
- KASSERT((length + ctx->cryptDataCount) <= ctx->cryptDataLength,
- ("More encryption data than allowed"));
+ if (ctx->blockIndex == 0 && length >= CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN) {
+ xor_and_encrypt(ctx, data, ctx->block);
+ length -= CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN;
+ data += CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN;
+ continue;
+ }
- while (length) {
- uint8_t *ptr;
-
copy_amt = MIN(sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex,
length);
ptr = ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex;
bcopy(data, ptr, copy_amt);
data += copy_amt;
ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt;
- ctx->cryptDataCount += copy_amt;
length -= copy_amt;
if (ctx->blockIndex == sizeof(ctx->staging_block)) {
/* We've got a full block */
xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
ctx->blockIndex = 0;
- bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
}
}
return (0);
@@ -264,11 +152,12 @@ AES_CBC_MAC_Final(uint8_t *buf, void *vctx)
* left over to encrypt.
*/
if (ctx->blockIndex != 0) {
+ memset(ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex, 0,
+ CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - ctx->blockIndex);
xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
- ctx->cryptDataCount += ctx->blockIndex;
- ctx->blockIndex = 0;
- explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
}
+ explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+
bzero(s0, sizeof(s0));
s0[0] = (15 - ctx->nonceLength) - 1;
bcopy(ctx->nonce, s0 + 1, ctx->nonceLength);
diff --git a/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h b/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h
index 51833a212f6c..50694e5d4b44 100644
--- a/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h
+++ b/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h
@@ -46,13 +46,11 @@
* the encryption one is similar.
*/
struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx {
- uint64_t authDataLength, authDataCount;
- uint64_t cryptDataLength, cryptDataCount;
- int blockIndex;
uint8_t staging_block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
uint8_t block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
- const uint8_t *nonce;
+ int blockIndex;
int nonceLength; /* This one is in bytes, not bits! */
+ const uint8_t *nonce;
/* AES state data */
int rounds;
uint32_t keysched[4*(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR+1)];
diff --git a/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c b/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c
index ae71f0d6c096..e51bade8a3f8 100644
--- a/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c
+++ b/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c
@@ -636,16 +636,69 @@ out:
return (error);
}
+static void
+build_ccm_b0(const char *nonce, u_int nonce_length, u_int aad_length,
+ u_int data_length, u_int tag_length, uint8_t *b0)
+{
+ uint8_t *bp;
+ uint8_t flags, L;
+
+ KASSERT(nonce_length >= 7 && nonce_length <= 13,
+ ("nonce_length must be between 7 and 13 bytes"));
+
+ /*
+ * Need to determine the L field value. This is the number of
+ * bytes needed to specify the length of the message; the length
+ * is whatever is left in the 16 bytes after specifying flags and
+ * the nonce.
+ */
+ L = 15 - nonce_length;
+
+ flags = ((aad_length > 0) << 6) +
+ (((tag_length - 2) / 2) << 3) +
+ L - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we need to set up the first block, which has flags, nonce,
+ * and the message length.
+ */
+ b0[0] = flags;
+ memcpy(b0 + 1, nonce, nonce_length);
+ bp = b0 + 1 + nonce_length;
+
+ /* Need to copy L' [aka L-1] bytes of data_length */
+ for (uint8_t *dst = b0 + CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - 1; dst >= bp; dst--) {
+ *dst = data_length;
+ data_length >>= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* NB: OCF only supports AAD lengths < 2^32. */
+static int
+build_ccm_aad_length(u_int aad_length, uint8_t *blk)
+{
+ if (aad_length < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) {
+ be16enc(blk, aad_length);
+ return (sizeof(uint16_t));
+ } else {
+ blk[0] = 0xff;
+ blk[1] = 0xfe;
+ be32enc(blk + 2, aad_length);
+ return (2 + sizeof(uint32_t));
+ }
+}
+
static int
swcr_ccm_cbc_mac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
- u_char tag[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
u_char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+ u_char blk[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
+ u_char tag[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
const struct auth_hash *axf;
- int error, ivlen;
+ int error, ivlen, len;
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
@@ -657,25 +710,24 @@ swcr_ccm_cbc_mac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop
*crp)
ivlen = csp->csp_ivlen;
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
- /*
- * AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
- * data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
- */
- ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
- ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = 0;
+ /* Supply MAC with IV */
+ axf->Reinit(&ctx, crp->crp_iv, ivlen);
- axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
- if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
- error = axf->Update(&ctx, crp->crp_aad, crp->crp_aad_length);
- else
- error = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start,
- crp->crp_payload_length, axf->Update, &ctx);
- if (error)
- return (error);
+ /* Supply MAC with b0. */
+ build_ccm_b0(crp->crp_iv, ivlen, crp->crp_payload_length, 0,
+ swa->sw_mlen, blk);
+ axf->Update(&ctx, blk, CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN);
+
+ len = build_ccm_aad_length(crp->crp_payload_length, blk);
+ axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
+
+ crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length,
+ axf->Update, &ctx);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(tag, &ctx);
+ error = 0;
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
u_char tag2[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
@@ -689,6 +741,7 @@ swcr_ccm_cbc_mac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop
*crp)
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, tag);
}
explicit_bzero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+ explicit_bzero(blk, sizeof(blk));
explicit_bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
return (error);
}
@@ -733,24 +786,35 @@ swcr_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
ivlen = csp->csp_ivlen;
- /*
- * AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
- * data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
- */
- ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;
- ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
-
/* Supply MAC with IV */
axf->Reinit(&ctx, crp->crp_iv, ivlen);
+ /* Supply MAC with b0. */
+ _Static_assert(sizeof(blkbuf) >= CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN,
+ "blkbuf too small for b0");
+ build_ccm_b0(crp->crp_iv, ivlen, crp->crp_aad_length,
+ crp->crp_payload_length, swa->sw_mlen, blk);
+ axf->Update(&ctx, blk, CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN);
+
/* Supply MAC with AAD */
- if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
- error = axf->Update(&ctx, crp->crp_aad, crp->crp_aad_length);
- else
- error = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start,
- crp->crp_aad_length, axf->Update, &ctx);
- if (error)
- return (error);
+ if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) {
+ len = build_ccm_aad_length(crp->crp_aad_length, blk);
+ axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
+ if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
+ axf->Update(&ctx, crp->crp_aad,
+ crp->crp_aad_length);
+ else
+ crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start,
+ crp->crp_aad_length, axf->Update, &ctx);
+
+ /* Pad the AAD (including length field) to a full block. */
+ len = (len + crp->crp_aad_length) % CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN;
+ if (len != 0) {
+ len = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - len;
+ memset(blk, 0, CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN);
+ axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
+ }
+ }
if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL)
exf->setkey(swe->sw_kschedule, crp->crp_cipher_key,
