Hi Johann On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 6:37 PM, Johann Hofmann <jhofm...@mozilla.com> wrote:
> Hey, > > concerns about the viability of such a decentralized systems aside, I > still don't understand the advantage of blocking on an API level vs. simply > showing the SafeBrowsing error page that we currently have in place. > I think I explained my self badly. It is not on an API level, it on origin level but it should be a P2P protocol where not one actor only has full control of that list. Entries on that list would be agreed on a network scale, so the peers agree that a domain is harmful. > > Why would we continue to allow a user to visit a clearly harmful page? > Well, it depends. I remember a couple of occasions where Pirate Bay was blocked. It was one of the mirrors that appeared after closing the original site. The SafeBrowsing UI was not informing me about the potential damage I could suffer. It only talked about phishing. I wanted to contiue browsing. In my opinion, the final decision should come from the user. That said, it does not mean the UI could encourage to not doing it. > > You're saying that a user should be allowed to shoot their own feet. How > would that be different from the existing permission prompts? This sounds > like it could be easily maneuvered with some social engineering from the > website. > Several times you propose new functionallity to the Web, spec editors must to remove some features because of potential danger. It means that the legit usage is useful but if abused, it would be bad for the user. The protocol would allow to decrease the risk of shipping powerful APIs. > > Your proposal says " what happens from here is up to the browser". This > doesn't really make a good impression to me as a browser developer since it > appears like important UI questions are just hand-waved away in your > concept. > Then the explanation is badly worded. Sorry. What I wanted to mean is that once, a Web property is declared harmful, it is not part of the protocol to decide what happens next. Firefox could decide to let the user decide while SuperSafeBrowser woud decide to not do it. The protocol can give recommendations of what to be shown and I see this as an opportunity to research on "important UI questions" as you said. > > Cheers, > > Johann Thank you for your comments. > > > On 23/03/2017 02:09, Jonathan Kingston wrote: > >> This seems a little like the idea WOT(https://www.mywot.com/) had, >> Showing >> the user that they might be looking at a website that isn't considered >> great but isn't perhaps bad enough to be blocked. >> >> I agree that one web actor owning this power isn't a great place to be in >> and that in itself might be enough justification in at least looking >> further into this direction. >> >> If there was enough evidence to suggest we should revoke an advert >> providers ability to track someone without breaking the web that might be >> interesting. >> There is also some research (which I am not sure I can share publicly) to >> suggest we should limit API usage to avoid security flaws within browsers >> based upon a strong correlation of Lines of Code, CVE's and the low number >> of sites that use those APIs. Perhaps there is a rationale to make >> websites >> earn enough trust for new features that have a high risk. For example >> would >> Reddits sub resources really need WebVR or WebGL? >> But we would also have to counter the cost of building this over just >> making the APIs secure in the first place and also understand we would >> hurt >> web innovation with that too. >> >> On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 10:11 PM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: >> >> There seem to be three basic ideas here: >>> >>> 0. Blacklisting at the level of API rather than site. >>> 1. Some centralized but democratic mechanism for building a list of >>> misbehaving sites. >>> 2. A mechanism for distributing the list of misbehaving sites to clients. >>> >>> As Jonathan notes, Firefox already has a mechanism for doing #2, which is >>> to say >>> "Safe Browsing". Now, Safe Browsing is binary, either a site is good or >>> bad, but >>> specific APIs aren't disabled, but it's easy to see how you would extend >>> it to that >>> if you actually wanted to provide that function. I'm not sure that's >>> actually >>> very attractive--it's hard enough for users to understand safe browsing. >>> Safe >>> Browsing is of course centralized, but that comes with a number of >>> advantages >>> and it's not clear what the advantage of decentralized blacklist >>> dissemination >>> is, given the networking realities. >>> >>> You posit a mechanism for forming the list of misbehaving sites, but >>> distributed >>> reputation is really hard, and it's not clear that Google is actually >>> doing a bad >>> job of running Safe Browsing, so given that this is a fairly major >>> unsolved problem, >>> I'd be reluctant to set out to build a mechanism like this without a >>> pretty clear >>> design. >>> >>> -Ekr >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 2:40 PM, Salvador de la Puente < >>> sdelapue...@mozilla.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Jonathan >>>> >>>> In the short and medium terms, it scales better than a white list and >>>> >>> distributes the effort of finding APIs misuses. Mozilla and other vendor >>> >>>> browser could still review the code of the site and add its vote in >>>> favour >>>> or against the Web property. >>>> >>>> In the long term, the system would help finding new security threats >>>> such >>>> a >>>> tracking or fingerprinting algorithms by encouraging the honest report >>>> of >>>> evidences, somehow. >>>> >>>> With this system, the threat is considered the result of both potential >>>> risk and chances of actual misuse. The revocation protocol reduces >>>> threatening situations by minimising the number of Web properties >>>> abusing >>>> the APIs. >>>> >>>> As a side effect, it provides the infrastructure for a real distributed >>>> and >>>> cross browser database which can be of utility for other unforeseen >>>> uses. >>>> >>>> What do you think? >>>> >>>> >>>> El 8 mar. 2017 10:54 p. m., "Jonathan Kingston" <jkings...@mozilla.com> >>>> escribió: >>>> >>>> Hey, >>>> What would be the advantage of using this over the safesite list? >>>> Obviously >>>> there would be less broken sites on the web as we would be permitting >>>> the >>>> site to still be viewed by the user rather than just revoking the >>>> permission but are there other advantages? >>>> >>>> On Sun, Mar 5, 2017 at 4:23 PM, Salvador de la Puente < >>>> sdelapue...@mozilla.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi, folks. >>>>> >>>>> Some time ago, I've started to think about an idea to experiment with >>>>> >>>> new >>>> >>>>> powerful Web APIs: a sort of "deceptive site" database for harmful uses >>>>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>> browsers APIs. I've been curating that idea and come up with the >>>>> >>>> concept of >>>> >>>>> a "revocation protocol" to revoke user granted permissions for origins >>>>> abusing those APIs. >>>>> >>>>> I published the idea on GitHub [1] and I was wondering about the >>>>> utility >>>>> and feasibility of such a system so I would thank any feedback you want >>>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>>> provide. >>>>> >>>>> I hope it will be of interest for you. >>>>> >>>>> [1] https://github.com/delapuente/revocation-protocol >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> <salva /> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> dev-platform mailing list >>>>> dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org >>>>> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> dev-platform mailing list >>>> dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org >>>> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >> dev-platform mailing list >> dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org >> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform >> > > -- <salva /> _______________________________________________ dev-platform mailing list dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform
