---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Igor Bukanov <i...@mir2.org> Date: 11 October 2013 15:02 Subject: Re: Defending against malicious SSL proxy To: Brian Smith <br...@briansmith.org>
>From a practical point of view anything that requires changes in the existing SSL infrastructure cannot be deployed quickly. Moreover, until all clients support new protocols the server must keep supporting the old way bringing extra deployment headaches. Perhaps that is the reason why everybody still rely on certificate and trust chains. To move forward it would be nice to reuse the existing infrastructure. Hence the idea of using mutual password authentication just to verify SSL certificates. This can be implemented on the application level without updating HTTP servers and with minimal application-specific code. On 11 October 2013 10:33, Brian Smith <br...@briansmith.org> wrote: > On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 10:35 AM, Igor Bukanov <i...@mir2.org> wrote: >> To fight with this issue a help from the browser is essential. One >> possibility is to replace HTTPS with SRP (srp.stanford.edu) or J-PAKE >> like protocol that allows for the user and the server *mutually* >> verify each other without leaking a password. However, this is very >> drastic as it require to switch the whole site to the new protocol. >> What is essential is to allow a gradual switch where a site can >> quickly protect few important pages without significant changes in the >> current setup. > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-oiwa-http-mutualauth-12 > > See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01 for a > different approach. I also posted a message about ChannelID on this > list recently. > > Cheers, > Brian > -- > Mozilla Networking/Crypto/Security (Necko/NSS/PSM) _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
