El viernes, 15 de enero de 2016, 13:42:41 (UTC+1), [email protected] escribió: > Hi all. > > We have developed a solution plan for this issues. > > We are going to audit in-scope CAs. Finally our FNMT-RCM CAs hierarchy audit > scheme will be as follows: > > + AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM > + AC Administración Pública > - Issues: SSL certs, QCP certs > - Audits: WebTrust for CAs, WebTrust SSL BRs, ETSI 101 456 > + AC Componentes Informáticos > - Issues: SSL certs > - Audits: WebTrust for CAs, WebTrust SSL BRs > + AC FNMT Usuarios > - Issues: issues QCP certs, not restricted by EKU extension > - Audits: (ETSI 101 456 or WebTrust for CAS) and audit of non-existence > of SSL certs > + ISA CA Will be revoked in early 2016 > + AC APE No longer used. Will be revoked in early 2016 >
As we committed, we have been working intensively to follow this plan. We migrated all of our ISA CA's customers and last week this subCA was revoked. In the next days, "AC APE" will be revoked. Next month we have date with TÜViT for "AC Administración Pública" and "AC FNMT Usuarios" ETSI auditing. Currently, after corresponding audit, WebTrust for CAs seal and WebTrust SSL BRs audit report are beeing transacted and we hope to have them available in the coming days. We migrated all of our ISA CA's customers and last week this subCA was revoked. In the next days, "AC APE" will be revoked. Next month we have date with TÜViT for "AC Administración Pública" and "AC FNMT Usuarios" ETSI auditing. Currently, after corresponding audit, WebTrust for CAs seal and WebTrust SSL BRs audit report are beeing transacted and we hope to have them available in the coming days. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
