On 11/08/2013 09:02 PM, From Jeremy Rowley:
What does this mean for CAs who, relying on Mozilla’s checking of OCSP and support of the baseline requirements, established an expensive and geographically diverse infrastructure?
Probably get a smaller bill at the end of the month ;-)
Mozilla’s main argument is that revocation checking without hard-fail provides little security. Although I disagree with the premises, if the lack of hard-fail is really the issue, the obvious solution is to turn it on. Most of the CAs would be happy about that.
+1 -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. XMPP: start...@startcom.org Blog: http://blog.startcom.org/ Twitter: http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
