On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Michael Ströder <mich...@stroeder.com>wrote:

> Brian Smith wrote:
> > I always thought that the CRL requirement was in there because long of go
> > we expected that we'd eventually start fetching CRLs at some point, and
> > then it was left in there due to inertia, mostly.
> >
> > Keep in mind that S/MIME and TLS have different requirements.
>
> I really wonder why this is discussed *after* quickly hunking out CRL
> support
> even from Thunderbird and Seamonkey.
>

I spent a long time talking with Brendan and also with my former managers
at Mozilla about how we support Thunderbird while we improve Gecko for
Firefox. Unfortunately, Mozilla hasn't done a good job of frankly
explaining the policy. Basically, Gecko developers are allowed to basically
work almost as though Thunderbird doesn't exist; if we break something in
Thunderbird, it's up to the Thunderbird developers to fix it. It isn't
clear if Gecko developers actually have a responsibility to help integrate
fixes for Thunderbird, but I and others seem to all review patches to Gecko
for the Thunderbird team to fix breakage we caused.

In this instance, if we've broken something regarding S/MIME, it's up to
the Thunderbird developers to notice and fix it. Unfortunately, there are
no automated tests of S/MIME functionality (AFAICT) so it is likely that
nobody will notice if/when we break anything with S/MIME in Thunderbird.
AFAICT, the Thunderbird project is in need of somebody to volunteer to
maintain the S/MIME functionality, and has been in need of somebody for a
long time.

For a long time I've been wanting to remove the S/MIME code from Gecko
completely. It is likely that will happen the next time the S/MIME code
inconveniences us during Firefox development. I would guess that the
Thunderbird team would then import the S/MIME code into comm-central and
maintain it there.

Cheers,
Brian
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