On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 4:45 PM, Kathleen Wilson <[email protected]> wrote:
> OK. Changed to the following. > > https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/mozpkix- > testing#Things_for_CAs_to_Fix > -- > 1. For all new intermediate certificate issuance, use the "TLS Web Server > Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)" (serverAuth) EKU if that intermediate > certificate will be signing SSL certificates. Mozilla will stop recognizing > the "Netscape Server Gated Crypto (2.16.840.1.113730.4.1)" EKU. > That isn't quite right either. It is OK for the intermediate certificate to omit the EKU extension entirely. But, if an intermediate does include an EKU extension then it must include id-kp-serverAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1). Additionally, no certificates should contain the Netscape Server Gated Crypto (2.16.840.1.113730.4.1) EKU, which is already no longer recognized for end-entity certificates and which will be no longer supported for intermediate certificates soon. New externally-operated subordinate CA certificates should/must include an EKU extension that does NOT contain id-kp-serverAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) or anyExtendedKeyPurpose (2.5.29.37.0) if the subordinate CA is not authorized to issue TLS server certificates. Conversely, new externally-operated subordinate CA certificates should/must include an EKU extension with id-kp-serverAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) if they are allowed to issue TLS certificates. Remember that we added the new enforcement of EKU in intermediates in mozilla::pkix in order to enhance the ability of CAs to technically constrain externally-operated sub-CAs. Cheers, Brian _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
