I hadn't caught the wiki update -- that's terrific! Thanks for pointing it
out.

> I can make an announcement in Mozilla's Security Blog if you all think
that is needed.

I do think a quick announcement, linking to your wiki page and linking to
MS' and Chrome's announcements, would be helpful in communicating to the
world that This Is Happening.

-- Eric


On Thu, Aug 28, 2014 at 12:52 PM, Kathleen Wilson <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Yep.
>
> I recently added the following. Feedback welcome/appreciated.
>
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices#SHA-1_Certificates
> ==
> SHA-1 certificates may be compromised when attackers can create a fake
> cert that hashes to the same value as one with a legitimate signature, and
> is hence trusted. Mozilla can mitigate this potential vulnerability by
> turning off support for SHA-1 based signatures. The SHA-1 root certificates
> don’t necessarily need to be removed from NSS, because the signatures of
> root certificates are not validated (roots are self-signed). Disabling
> SHA-1 will impact intermediate and end entity certificates, where the
> signatures are validated.
>
> There are still many end entity certificates that would be impacted if
> support for SHA-1 based signatures was turned off. Therefore, we are hoping
> to give CAs time to react, and are planning to turn off support for SHA-1
> based signatures in 2017. Note that Mozilla will take this action earlier
> if needed to keep our users safe.
>
> CAs should not be issuing new SHA-1 certificates, and should be migrating
> their customers off of SHA-1 intermediate and end-entity certificates.
>
> If a CA still needs to issue SHA-1 certificates for compatibility reasons,
> then those SHA-1 certificates should expired before 2017.
> ==
>
>
> Also, this topic is on my list of things to included in the next CA
> Communication. I was hoping to not have to do another CA Communication
> until I have migrated the CA Program data into SalesForce.com and have a
> more automated way to handle CA Communications and responses. (this project
> has started, more info to come as we make progress)
>
> I can make an announcement in Mozilla's Security Blog if you all think
> that is needed. (btw... I'm also drafting a security blog about 1024-bit
> certs.)
>
> Thanks,
> Kathleen
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>



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