+1

On Fri, Feb 6, 2015 at 4:49 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>
wrote:

> I dislike the idea.  Other CAs contribute to the discussion but should not
> the gatekeeper. Ryan Sleevi makes complete sense since Google uses the NSS
> store.  Commercial CAs actually having a say on another CA's inclusion
> (outside of the current public discussion) seems like something that should
> be prohibited by policy.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:
> dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert....@lists.mozilla.org]
> On Behalf Of Kathleen Wilson
> Sent: Friday, February 6, 2015 2:37 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: Updating Peers of Mozilla's CA Certificates and CA
> Certificate Policy modules
>
> On 2/5/15 10:41 PM, Man Ho (Certizen) wrote:
> >
> > However, if Mozilla would add one
> > more peer from CA background (except Let's Encrypt), it'd be even better.
> >
>
>
> There are indeed several representatives of the CAs in Mozilla's program
> who regularly provide valuable contributions to the discernment and
> discussions regarding the CA program.
>
> How do you all feel about the idea of one (or more) of the representatives
> of the CAs in Mozilla's program also being a Peer of the CA Certificates
> module?
>
> Reminder of what this means...
> Name: CA Certificates
> Description: Determine which root certificates should be included in
> Mozilla software products, which trust bits should be set on them, and
> which of them should be enabled for EV treatment. Evaluate requests from
> Certification Authorities (CAs) for inclusion or removal of root
> certificates, and for updating trust bit settings or enabling EV treatment
> for already included root certificates.
>
> Kathleen
>
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