On 03/23/15 22:47, Richard Barnes wrote: > Dear dev.security.policy, > > It has been discovered that an intermediate CA under the CNNIC root has > mis-issued certificates for some Google domains. Full details can be found > in blog posts by Google [0] and Mozilla [1]. We would like to discuss what > further action might be necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the > Mozilla root program, and the safety of its users. > > There have been incidents of this character before. When ANSSI issued an > intermediate that was used for MitM, name constraints were added to limit > its scope to French government domains. When TurkTrust mis-issued > intermediate certificates, they changed their procedures and then they were > required to be re-audited in order to confirm their adherence to those > procedures. > > We propose to add name constraints to the CNNIC root in NSS to minimize the > impact of any future mis-issuance incidents. The “update procedures and > re-audit” approach taken with TurkTrust is not suitable for this scenario. > Because the mis-issuance was done by a customer of CNNIC, it’s not clear > that updates to CNNIC’s procedures would address the risks that led to this > mis-issuance. We will follow up this post soon with a specific list of > proposed constraints. > > Please send comments to this mailing list. We would like to have a final > plan by around 1 April.
Does any part of CNNIC's CPS cover issuing external subCAs at all? When did CNNIC start issuing external subCAs? Did CNNIC take steps suggesting they planned to comply with Mozilla's subCA policy for this CA: - Did they have a CPS for this subCA? - Is there evidence that any auditing of this subCA took place/was planned? _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
