On Wed, October 28, 2015 1:55 am, mycho...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>  Dear Sleevi
>
>  First of all, I appreciate your detailed opinios and suggestions
>
>  In terms of option B (application to only be for that of your SSL/website
>  CA rather than your root CA)
>  All CAs in CA hierarchy (including Root CA) has to follow a government
>  law. So, it's not easy to adapt
>  option B in this case

Earlier, you said "Actually, e-Signature law doesn't mention of SSL
directly", which seems to run counter to your statements here.

It also does not appear to be strictly necessary for your SSL issuance to
be rooted in the same CA hierarchy, which was somewhat the point of Option
B.

Put differently, you've indicated that local law does not govern the SSL
issuance, and the only reason you're in this predicament is because you've
chosen to transitively root your SSL issuance to a root that does follow
local law. Further, you've indicated that the reason your CPS is
non-conforming does not, seemingly, appear to be related to local law, but
rather the policies of the Government-operated Root, for which there does
not seem any technical necessity to root yourself in.

As such, it's unclear why Option B is not viable. I can understand
difficult, but I do want to separate out difficulty/complexity from legal
necessity, as they have very different impacts with respect to how the
program should be operated.

>  If Root CA provides a
>  mapping table between RFC3647 and current
>  CPS for more easy review whether current CPS comply with the contents of
>  RFC3647 or not, do you think is it acceptable?

Personally, I do not think it should be acceptable, as this seems to be a
result of taking shortcuts / not fully considering the program
requirements for the recognition of your SSL CA, rather than an intrinsic
legal quandary as you have presented.

However, it's entirely possible I've misunderstood, so I appreciate the
continued explanations to develop a shared understanding.

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