Hi all.

We have developed a solution plan for this issues.

> I believe that some of the concerns that were raised have been resolved, 
> and that the remaining open concerns are as follows. Please reply if I 
> missed any other items that still need to be resolved.
> 
> 1) This root certificate has subordinate certificates that are not 
> technically constrained and not audited/disclosed according to sections 
> 8-10 of Mozilla's CA Certificate Policy. The noted subCAs are "AC FNMT 
> Usuarios" (doesn't issue server certificates) and "ISA CA" (server 
> certificates are issued exclusively to a very restricted (almost 
> private) environment). Unless there are technical constraints on the 
> intermediate CA certificates representing those subCAs which make it 
> impossible for them to issue TLS or S/MIME certificates, they are 
> in-scope for this inclusion request, because they are a potential source 
> of mis-issuance which puts users of the Mozilla trust store at risk.

We are going to audit in-scope CAs. Finally our FNMT-RCM CAs hierarchy audit 
scheme will be as follows:

+ AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM
   + AC Administración Pública
     - Issues: SSL certs, QCP certs
     - Audits: WebTrust for CAs, WebTrust SSL BRs, ETSI 101 456
   + AC Componentes Informáticos
     - Issues: SSL certs
     - Audits: WebTrust for CAs, WebTrust SSL BRs
   + AC FNMT Usuarios
     - Issues: issues QCP certs, not restricted by EKU extension
     - Audits: (ETSI 101 456 or WebTrust for CAS) and audit of non-existence of 
SSL certs
   + ISA CA Will be revoked in early 2016
   + AC APE No longer used. Will be revoked in early 2016

As you can see, the two subCAs in-scope will be audited ("AC Usuarios) and 
revoked ("ISA CA"). Also, "AC APE" which is no longer used will be revoked

> 2) The allowed methods of verifying domain name ownership/control must 
> be in compliance with section 3.2.2.4 of version 1.3 (or later) of the 
> Baseline Requirements.

ISA CA is going to be revoked.

With this audit scheme, the remaining open issues would be solved.
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