I think that yes, the response to #1c should include code signing
certificates.  As the description notes, anything a CA signs presents a
risk.

I'm not sure what you're saying about June 30, 2016?  I don't think this
question is related to actual enforcement, just trying to gauge the degree
of residual risk that is out there even after the prohibition on SHA-1 web
certs.

On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 2:04 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Yes. 1c encompasses all certs, which includes code signing (not supported
> by
> Mozilla) and client (somewhat supported by Mozilla).  If we have to change
> by June 30, 2016, this is trumping the Microsoft date, despite Mozilla
> dropping support for code signing certificates last year.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dev-security-policy
> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley
> [email protected]
> .org] On Behalf Of Kathleen Wilson
> Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2016 11:46 AM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: Drafting Q1 2016 CA Communication
>
> On 3/23/16 10:26 AM, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> > What about code signing and s/MIME certs?  Code signing is still used
> > by MS for legacy software until Jan 2017.
> >
> > On Tuesday, March 22, 2016 at 9:33:19 AM UTC-7, [email protected]
> wrote:
> >> The following 'ACTION #1c' has been added to the communication, which
> >> is
> > here:
> >> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Communications#March_2016
> >> and click on "Link to DRAFT of March 2016 CA Communication".
> >>
>
> Jeremy, I'm not sure I understand your question. Is it in regards to ACTION
> #1c?
>
> Kathleen
>
>
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